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ABSTRACT
Four decades of Apartheid has left South Africa with one of the most unequal income
distributions in the world. This inequality is reflected in the access to infrastructure services
across different population groups and geographical regions. A major challenge to the new
government is to address this inequality and ensure that everybody has access to at least basic
levels of infrastructure services. A first step in this process is restructuring and redefining the
role of local governments.
South Africa is embarking on a process of decentralization in the hope that placing
greater responsibilities with local governments will facilitate infrastructure service delivery. An
analysis of local government revenue and expenditure shows a fairly decentralized system
already in place, although income disparities force certain local governments to rely more on
grant transfers than others. Policy should, and does, focus on ways in which local governments
can be strengthened fiscally and institutionally in order to enhance service delivery capacity.
This thesis outlines the evolution of local governments in South Africa, details the
backlog which exists in infrastructure services, the cost of upgrading existing and providing new
infrastructure services, and develops a framework for identifying the various sources of finance
which may be available to local governments for financing infrastructure investments. Emphasis
is specifically placed on linking grants from higher tiers of government with loans from private
sources. It is argued that a grant-loan linkage system will help meet national equity objectives
while not attenuating incentives of local governments to borrow. Borrowing from private
sources will impose financial discipline on local governments, thereby encouraging efficiency in
infrastructure service delivery.
While there are many ways to design a grant-loan linkage system, an example is
developed to show how such a mechanism may work. Ultimately the design of a grant-loan
linkage system will depend on the political, economic, and social conditions of the country
where it is to be implemented.
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Chapter I. Introduction and Objectives
Fiscal decentralization has been receiving widespread attention in both academic and policy-
making circles, and while its beneficial and harmful effects are hotly debated, most national governments
see it as a means to alleviate pressure on the central fiscus, while transferring decision-making
responsibility to sub-national and local levels of government. Decentralization implies that different
tiers of government are not only responsible for how they spend their money, but they are also expected
to raise most of their own revenues to finance such expenditures.
A. Thesis Objectives
This thesis will develop a framework for making decisions about financing the capital
expenditure (investment) associated with infrastructure service delivery. The main question to be
addressed is: what avenues of funding are available to -- and appropriate for -- local governments? I
will develop a methodology which could be used to inform the policy-maker of various financing options
available for investment based on the characteristics of various types of projects and the local
governments.
There has been considerable emphasis regarding the local government financing of projects via
revenue raised through either direct cost recovery (user charges), local taxes, or loans. Given the
significant investment expenditure associated with infrastructure projects, most local governments will
not be able to finance them fully through the local tax base on a "pay-as-you-go" basis, but will have to
borrow money. The limited tax base of local authorities means that the amount they can borrow to
finance the fixed investment costs will also be limited. This relationship is a direct one: the poorer a
local government the less likely it is to obtain loans through the private capital markets. A certain
amount of grant money would therefore be needed from the central (or sub-national/provincial)
authorities, especially if equity or distribution issues were a concern. This raises the question of how to
structure a grant and loan system which will help with equity objectives, while not attenuating the
incentives of local governments to borrow. While it is generally assumed that grants should be made
only to poorer local governments and loans used only in richer ones, this thesis will investigate the
manner in which grants and loans could possibly be linked in all types of local governments and projects
in order to encourage greater equity and efficiency.
South Africa will be used as a case study because it is a country which is rapidly decentralizing
its fiscal structures from the central to sub-national (provincial) and local (municipal) governments. The
new government has constitutionally committed itself to a program of fiscal decentralization. The
Department of Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations (DIFR) within the Department of Finance (DOF) has
made proposals to decentralize the entire national fiscal structure and reform intergovernmental fiscal
relations accordingly. The proposals are very broad and the DIFR suggests that the central government
will provide a grant transfer to local authorities so that they can have at least a basic level of
infrastructure service (which includes water supply, sanitation, storm drainage, electricity, and roads)
within a ten year period (Department of Finance 1996). Should the local government desire a level of
service provision above basic, it will have to borrow money to finance the investment. This proposal
overlooks the ability of various local authorities to raise money, and the fact that some may need more
than others, based on their ability to borrow.
B. Thesis Outline
This thesis develops a framework for financing infrastructure projects, paying special attention
to linking grants and loans to encourage equity and efficiency. The aim of the thesis is to provide a
means by which an integrated system of financing infrastructure projects under fiscally decentralized
government structures can be made operational.
Chapter II describes the evolution of South Africa's local government structure from the
Apartheid era, during which local governments were defined along racial lines, to the post-Apartheid era
when local governments of all race groups were amalgamated. Local governments, like their provincial
counterparts, exhibit wide disparities in income and fiscal capacity, posing a problem for local
infrastructure service delivery as affordability varies widely. The amalgamation of financially strong
White local authorities and fiscally weak Black ones has caused marked inequalities in access to services
even within local governments.
An assessment of infrastructure service needs is made in Chapter III, which shows how
Apartheid caused access to services to be defined along racial lines. Provinces also portray wide
variances in access to infrastructure services. Five infrastructure services are discussed, namely: water,
sanitation, storm drainage, roads, and electricity. The data in this section draws mainly on the SALDRU
(1994) household survey and the assessments of the infrastructure backlog in urban areas made by the
MIIF (South Africa 1995a,b). The chapter highlights the number of people who live in deprived low-
income settlements, and assesses the infrastructure backlog by showing access to each type of
infrastructure broken down by level of service.
The cost of addressing the backlog in infrastructure service delivery is analyzed in Chapter IV.
Addressing the backlog will require two stages: first, existing infrastructure services will have to be
upgraded, and second, infrastructure services will have to be provided in new settlements, known as
"greenfield" development sites. The cost estimates are made assuming that the backlog will be
addressed over a period of ten years.
Chapter V discusses the role of local governments in infrastructure service provision. First, the
role of local governments is spelled out as defined by the new constitution, the local government
transition act, and the MIIF. The share which local and provincial governments command in revenue
and expenditure patterns of total government are presented to show the financial strength of each. In
order to assess their ability to deliver services, revenues are broken down by tax and non-tax sources, and
expenditures are disaggregated into its current and capital components. Finally, an outline is given of
various short-run grant (and subsidy) programs intended to kick-start infrastructure delivery by local
governments, while at the same time building local capacity for service delivery.
Intergovernmental grants are needed to address equity concerns in infrastructure service
delivery, but it is also the policy of the central government that local governments should -- as far as
possible -- borrow money to finance capital expenditures, and rely heavily on local revenues to cover
operating costs. Chapter VI develops the vector financing method (VFM) for linking different types of
grants and loans from various sources, in order to facilitate local governments' expenditures on
infrastructure investments. The financing methods chosen will depend on the characteristics of the local
government and the type of project being considered. An application of the framework shows how it
may be made operational by allowing decision-makers to observe the impacts which different policies
may have on desired outcomes.
Chapter VII provides an application of how a grant-loan linkage system might be made
operational. A lack of data limits the empirical application of the method, although it does allow a
conceptualization of the process of splitting grants and loans in infrastructure finance.
Chapter II. Local Government Structure in South Africa
The South African government has committed itself to a policy of decentralization, or more
accurately to one of strengthening local governments and granting them greater autonomy. A major
objective is to transfer the responsibility for infrastructure service provision to local governments (LGs)
thereby allowing for greater decision-making at the local government level, and encouraging community
participation. This is based on the assumption that local governments' performance will be improved if
they work more closely with communities and grass-root organizations. Community participation should
allow the government to better assess communities' needs, their willingness to pay for services, and their
preferences (demand) for different combinations of service levels for various infrastructure services.
This chapter details the evolution of the local government structure in South Africa. First, a brief
overview of the structure during the Apartheid era is given. This is followed by an outline of the current
structure, which is a result of the transition to democracy following the April 1994 elections.
A. Apartheid Structure of Local Government
Under Apartheid each racial group was "governed" by a separate authority in order to meet the
national government's objective of racially segregated development. On a national scale the government
passed the Land Acts of 1913 and 1936 creating reserves in the form of four homelands and ten self-
governing territories (SGTs) designed to contain the African population. The Native Urban Areas Act of
1923 allowed Africans to live in townships within "White" urban areas outside these reserves. These
townships were generally low-income African urban settlements, whose inhabitants tended to be
informal squatters. African settlement within the urban areas outside the reserves were seen as
temporary, and pass laws were used to enforce a policy of influx control, which aimed at controlling the
African urban population and the African labor force in urban areas. When the National Party assumed
power in 1948 the Group Areas Act was passed, and it effectively sought to create the "Apartheid city"
by segregating each population group, creating separate residential and commercial areas for Whites,
Coloreds, Indians and Africans.'
Before 1971 the White Local Authorities (WLAs) administered the African townships within
their jurisdiction. In 1971 the government passed the Bantu Affairs Administration Act, which
established Administration Boards (ABs) for urban Africans, known in what was then the Cape Province2
as Community Councils (CCs). The lack of credibility which these ABs and CCs had amongst their
"constituents" led the government to pass Act 102 in 1982 creating fully independent and autonomous
Black Local Authorities (BLAs), although they were subject to interventions and control from the
provincial and central government. The BLAs were created to manage the African areas only, and did
not include Coloreds and Indians in their jurisdictions.
In January 1976 the Minister of Finance appointed a committee of inquiry into the finances of
local authorities (LAs), which published its findings in the Browne Report (South Africa 1980). The
Browne Report was to devote special attention to the problems of financing "non-white" local
authorities, to investigate the possibility of creating autonomous municipal authorities for Coloreds and
Indians, and to propose ways to strengthen the ABs and CCs for Africans. The report focused primarily
on Colored and Indian local authorities and gave very little attention to African local authorities,
although it pointed out that Africans in particular had a serious backlog in local government facilities and
services (South Africa 1980: p.15). A major conclusion of the Browne Committee (South Africa 1980:
p.83) with regard to Colored and Indian municipalities was that:
"In order to establish viable local authorities for Coloureds and Asians (sic)... .a system of regular transfer
payments from White to Coloured and Asian authorities should be introduced, whereby the payments
would equal the calculated needs minus the ability to pay of Coloured and Asian authorities."
Use is made here of the South African Institute of Race Relations definition when referring to the different race
groups. Four race groups are defined: Whites, Indians, Colored (people of mixed race), and African. The term
Black is used to refer to all "non-white" groups, i.e. Indian, Colored, African.
2 Before 1994 South Africa consisted of four provinces, four homelands and ten self-governing territories (SGTs).
The new constitution abolished the homelands and SGTs, and created nine new provinces. The Cape Province, for
example, has been split into the Western Cape, Eastern Cape (which includes the Transkei and Ciskei homelands)
and the Northern Cape (which includes the Bophuthatswana homeland).
The notion of transfer payments on a regular basis from White to Colored and Indian local
authorities is reiterated throughout the Browne Report. In November 1980 the Minister of Finance
appointed a working group to conduct an in-depth review of the recommendations of the Browne Report.
The findings of this committee were published as the Croeser Report (South Africa 1982). The Croeser
Report expressed general agreement with many of the recommendations submitted by the Browne
Report, but concluded that the system of direct transfer payments from White to Colored and Indian local
authorities should not be accepted. Specifically, the Croeser Report (p.1) argued that:
"...a number of recommendations made in the Browne Committee's Report were not acceptable. There
was particular dissatisfaction about the recommendations relating to transfer payments from White local
authorities to Coloured and Asian (sic) local authorities..."
It is clear that the Croeser Report's conclusion to reject the Browne Report's recommendation
for fiscal transfers from White to Colored and Indian local authorities was politically motivated. In fact,
the Croeser Report (p.34) argues that a recommendation which encourages direct transfer payments from
White local authorities to those of other population groups is "politically highly vulnerable".
Historically, Coloreds and Indians fell under the administration of the WLAs, and in 1983 the
government passed a constitution which created Management Committees (MCs) for these two groups in
an attempt to create municipal authorities which would allow them to govern themselves. In reality the
BLAs and MCs were created to support and strengthen the Apartheid ideology of separate development,
and as such enjoyed very little, if any, political legitimacy amongst the people they were intended to
serve. In addition they had very limited revenue sources, and were dependent on transfers from higher
tiers of government in order to remain operational. Unlike their WLA counterparts, BLAs and MCs
could not access capital markets for loans, and their small revenue bases meant that they could not invest
in building the necessary infrastructure for their communities.
In order to address the infrastructure backlogs in the areas of greatest need, in 1987 the
government established Regional Services Councils (RSCs), or Joint Service Boards (JSBs) as they were
known in KwaZulu/Natal (van Ryneveld 1996). At first the RSCs consisted of White municipalities and
the Colored and Indian MCs. The African BLAs were allowed to join only after their fiscal "non-
viability" was acknowledged by the central government (Manche 1994). The RSCs were intended to
funnel transfers from the financially stronger WLAs to the fiscally weak areas in order to finance the
capital expenditure of infrastructure projects. The fiscal crises faced by many BLAs effectively meant
that the RSCs became a mechanism for bridging finance to cover the shortfall of current revenue over
current expenditure. BLAs were very dependent on transfers from the central government in order to
finance their services, and these grants accounted for 80% of BLA revenues (Ahmad 1996).
Even though the RSCs had representation from each population group's local authority, they
were still an attempt to maintain the system of racially separated local governments, hence they lacked
popular support and were exposed to the same opposition as were the BLAs and MCs. Furthermore,
representations on RSC boards, and vote allocations, were proportional to the value of services
consumed by local authorities, the direct result of which was to give greater power to WLAs, thereby
entrenching the system of control and dominance by Whites.
B. Post-Apartheid Structure of Local Government
Section 40(1) of South Africa's new constitution3 states that: "In the Republic, government is
constituted as national, provincial and local spheres of government which are distinctive, interdependent
and interrelated." The constitution contains chapters which spell out the role and function of the
"Provinces" (Chapter 6) and "Local Government" (Chapter 10).
Local governments or municipalities4 are granted the right to govern the affairs of their
constituents, are required to give priority to the basic needs of their communities, and are to provide
services in an equitable and sustainable manner. The constitution also calls for national and provincial
3 Act 108 of 1996: Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. As adopted on May 8, 1996 and amended on
October 11, 1996 by the Constitutional Assembly. The new constitution was signed into law on December 10,
1996.
governments to "support and strengthen the capacity of municipalities" (Section 154(1)). It is thus
envisioned that South Africa will have a devolved structure of governance in which local authorities are
responsible for managing their communities free from undue intervention from higher levels of
government. A devolved government structure is one form of decentralization that "occurs when
authority is transferred by central government to local-level government units holding corporate status
granted under state legislation." (Cohen and Peterson 1996: p.10).
The idea of strengthening local governments is not a new one, although it could be argued that
post-Apartheid South Africa represents the first attempt to strengthen local governments in a manner
which promotes not only efficiency, but also racial and regional equity. The current focus on the role of
local authorities thus presents the first real impetus to a policy of decentralization via the devolution of
power to the lowest tier of government. As explained in the previous section, past attempts at reforming
local governments were driven by Apartheid policies with very little regard for equity considerations or
for the financial self-sufficiency of groups other than Whites. The current post-Apartheid structure of
local government is of course no longer guided by such policies of racial segregation, and the
amalgamation of WLAs and the LAs of other population groups into single LGs will to some extent
facilitate the delivery of services within areas where there are deficiencies. The structure of LGs in
South Africa is such that LAs form substructures in LGs, i.e. many LAs can make up a single LG.
The transition from Apartheid government structures to the new structures legislated by the new
constitution consists of three phases, namely a pre-interim phase, an interim or transition phase, and the
final phase (South Africa 1995a). During the pre-interim phase transitional councils prepared for local
government elections which were held on November 1, 1995, with the exception of the Western Cape
and KwaZulu/Natal, which held their local elections in May and June 1996 respectively. The interim
phase began after the adoption of the new constitution on December 10, 1996. The final phase will come
4 The term municipality refers to the government of towns, which can be thought of as incorporated islands of
human settlements separate from the administration of their rural hinterland (Davey 1988).
into effect once the second set of elections required by the new constitution have been held. At present,
South Africa is therefore in the transition/interim phase as far as local government reform is concerned.
The institutional structure governing local authorities has undergone dramatic changes in
response to the new constitution and the Local Government Transition Act (LGTA) No. 209 of 1993.
The LGTA allowed for the approximately 1,300 racially segregated LAs to be amalgamated into 698
non-racial LAs. The new boundaries have resulted in three general types of urban local governments
defined as "complex centers", "large urban centers", and "urban centers" (South Africa 1995b). The
term "small centers" is used by South Africa (1995b) when referring to what are here called "large urban
centers". The decision to use the latter rather than the government's "small centers" is due to the
confusion that may otherwise result, as these "small centers" are generally larger in size than the "urban
centers" and using the government's terminology could lead to the belief that they are smaller.
Complex centers refer to the metropolitan areas, in which a large number of WLAs and BLAs
exist in close proximity to one another, often adjacent. The merged LAs constitute metropolitan areas
managed by Transitional Metropolitan Councils (TMCs), which were established to replace Apartheid
municipal structures. Former WLAs (including MCs) and BLAs were amalgamated into Metropolitan
Sub-Structures (MSSs) which function within the TMCs. Each TMC contains two or more MSSs, which
were elected during the local elections of 1995 and 1996. Two types of TMCs have emerged, known as
"soft-top" TMCs and "hard-top" TMCs. With soft-top TMCs pre-existing LAs merge into a TMC, but
LAs retain the boundaries and associated functions they had prior to the LGTA. Hard-top TMCs result
from a redrawing of internal LA boundaries in a way which does not always respect pre-existing LA
boundaries, and MSSs often do not retain all their functions and powers, which can be transferred to the
TMC level. In cases where TMCs are not formed, Services Councils (SCs) serve as replacements for
RSCs /JSBs in order to maintain service delivery. As such SCs retained RSC/JSB powers of taxation
(payroll and turnover levies), and the ability to redistribute funds from higher to lower income areas.
Large urban centers are non-metropolitan urban areas where one or more BLAs merged with
WLAs, resulting in what is known as a single Transitional Local Council (TLC). These urban areas
(estimated to be about 400 towns) usually consist of WLAs which are fiscally weak and hence have
limited capacity to expand services to the former black townships (or BLAs) with which they have been
merged. TLCs are located within, and form part of Services Councils, which were created to replace the
former RSCs and JSBs. In rural areas the TLCs form part of, and are located within, Regional Councils.
Urban centers refer to TLCs, which result from the merger of former distinctly urban WLAs
with black townships and informal settlements located in the former homeland and Self-Governing
Territories (SGTs). These TLCs are members of Services Councils (SCs), and contain BLAs which had
the most centralized administrative structures for service delivery and relied heavily on central transfers
to finance current and capital expenditures. As such, these LAs have the greatest potential to overburden
the TLCs of which they form part. Also, given that they are smaller in size than TMCs, it is unlikely that
they will experience any rapid expansion in their fiscal base and fiscal capacity.
Table 2.1: A Typology of Urban Local Government Structure
Class Population Local Local Govt. Examples
Govt. Sub-structure(LG) (LAs)
Metropolitan Over 2 million TMC MSS Cape Town, Durban,
Greater Johannesburg
Large Cities 500K - 2 million SC TLC Port-Elizabeth, Pietermaritzburg
Medium Cities 100K - 500K SC TLC Kimberley, Mmabatho
Small Towns Less than 1OOK SC TLC Upington, Tzaneen
Source: South Africa (1996)
TMC = Transitional Metropolitan Council, MSS = Municipal Sub-Structures, SC = Service Council, TLC = Transitional Local Council
Table 2.1 provides a typology of city sizes and their associated new local government structures
in South Africa. The typology identifies four principle urban classes based on size and is consistent with
the United Nations classification of cities in developing countries. City size is often strongly correlated
with average income levels, and a conurbation is usually characterized by a stronger fiscal base than a
smaller urban area. Table 2.2 contains summary data for the nine new provinces of South Africa,
presenting population and gross geographic product (GGP) per capita by province.
Table 2.2: Provincial Summary Statistics
(Population 1995, GGP 1994)
The data shows that four of the nine provinces have per capita incomes above the national
average, which corresponds to 35% of the population living in provinces with above average per capita
incomes and 65% with below average per capita incomes. Regional disparities also exist within
provinces, and financial capabilities of LAs within cities also differ. The differences in income across
regions have implications for the ability of various provinces and their LGs to address infrastructure
service backlogs. The extent of the infrastructure backlog and how it varies across major metropolitan
and other urban areas, and across population groups, is discussed next.
Population Gross Geographic Product
Total Proportion Per Capita Proportion
('000) of National of National
RSA 41,244 100.0 9,461 1.00
Gauteng 7,048 17.1 20,893 2.21
Western Cape 3,721 9.0 14,764 1.56
Northern Cape 742 1.8 10,848 1.15
Mpumalanga 3,007 7.3 10,625 1.12
Free State 2,783 6.7 8,647 0.91
KwaZulu/Natal 8,713 21.1 6,681 0.71
North-West 3,352 8.1 6,428 0.68
Eastern Cape 6,481 15.7 4,539 0.48
Northern Province 5,397 13.1 2,709 0.29
Source: Central Statistical Service (1997)
Chapter III. Infrastructure Service Needs in South Africa
This chapter will examine infrastructure shortages within deprived settlements in the major
urban areas,' as this is where new investments, and upgrades of existing infrastructure, will be most
demanded and needed in the near future.
While Apartheid officially ended with the country's first democratic elections of April 1994, it
has left the country with serious inequalities along racial lines in the access to infrastructure services. To
use the analogy of Wilson and Ramphele (1989): the scaffolding which built the structures of Apartheid
has been removed, but the building still stands firm, meaning that the inequitable economic structure still
remains firmly entrenched. Not only is South Africa's distribution of income one of the most unequal in
the world, with a Gini-coefficient of 0.66 (Wilson and Ramphele 1989: p.18), but access to basic services
such as water, sanitation, electricity, health and education is also highly unequal. An important objective
for the government is to address this inequality and implement policies to correct it, and to this end it has
designed and begun implementing its Reconstruction and Development Program (RDP 1995, South
Africa 1994b). The analysis here will draw mostly on the SALDRU (1994) household survey, the
"Municipal Infrastructure and Investment Framework (MIIF)" (South Africa 1995a,b) and the "Urban
Infrastructure and Investment Programme" (South Africa 1994a).
A. Population Estimates
In July 1995, South Africa's population was estimated at about 40 million people (CSS 1997,
South Africa 1995a,b). Of this, 76.1% are African, 2.6% are Indian, 8.5% are Colored, and 12.8% are
White. The urban sector accounts for 65 percent of the population, and produces over 80 % of GDP
(South Africa 1995a). Of the 26 million urban inhabitants, the four major metropolitan areas account for
14.8 million people or 37% of the total urban population (South Africa 1994a). The SALDRU (1994)
5 The four major urban areas are Cape Town, Witwatersrand (greater Johannesburg), Durban, and Port Elizabeth.
national household survey estimated the total population in mid-1993 at about 38.1 million people, and
projections based on the survey results supported this number. Assuming a population growth of about
3% per annum, as the South Africa (1994a and 1995a) reports do, produces a figure of about 40.4 million
people for the mid-1995 population. Using the correct figure for the population (or as close as possible),
has important consequences not only for the cost estimates of the MIIF, but also for the calculation of
benefits in project appraisals. Special attention will have to be paid to the urban areas, not only because
they contain the bulk of the population, but also due to their significant contribution to GDP.
Until the end of the 1980s the government controlled urban population growth by prohibiting the
migration of Africans from rural to urban areas, but with the breakdown of Apartheid and the abolition of
pass laws the influx of Africans into urban areas increased at very high rates. Since 1990 South Africa's
major metropolitan areas have been experiencing very rapid urbanization rates. Besides the lifting of
migration controls in 1986, the influx of people was exacerbated by the severe economic recession of the
late 1980s, and the drought and subsequent decline in agricultural output and employment in the early
1990s. People migrated to the cities seeking economic opportunities, and informal squatter settlements
emerged almost overnight, while existing ones expanded rapidly. Recently established squatter areas
need infrastructure services, which the government will have difficulty financing, at least in the
immediate future. The number of urban dwellers with deficient infrastructure service levels is estimated
to be about 67% or 9.9 million people (South Africa 1994a).
B. Assessing the Backlog in Infrastructure Service Delivery
A lack of infrastructure services poses a constraint on economic growth and also adversely
impacts the welfare of the population which has limited or no access to infrastructure services. The
spatial patterns of South Africa's cities have prevented firms from taking advantage of the scale and
agglomeration economies that generally characterize urban settlements (World Bank 1993, Krugman
1991), and the cost of such spatial distortion has not been trivial, as can be seen from the lack of services
and employment opportunities for the black population. In fact, these spatial distortions may have
contributed largely to the economy's secular decline, which hastened the fall of Apartheid (South Africa
1994a).
One particular result of the Apartheid city is that it imposes prohibitively high transportation
costs on the poor black population located at the periphery of the city, who must commute to the city
center and other distant areas where jobs are located. These transportation costs not only reduce
disposable income, but also raise the cost of a job search, making it expensive. Table 3.1 compares
average travel time and cost of a one-way fare between place of residence and employment.
These travel times and costs, and access to infrastructure services, are a result of the peculiar and
racially motivated manner in which South African cities were designed and allowed to develop.
Economic activities were located in or close to the city center or to white neighborhoods, while other
population groups were located (sometimes forcibly relocated) to the periphery of the cities, usually far
away from economic activities. These settlements were generally low-income in nature, had mediocre
infrastructure services, and had inadequate modes of public transportation to the city center and other
areas of employment.
Table 3.1: Average Time and Cost of Travel
Total Pop African Colored Indian White
All S.A. (Time mins.) 36 40 34 49 24
Metropolitan 41 52 43 51 28
Urban 31 38 27 47 17
Rural 33 34 7 16* 17
All S.A. (Cost Rand) 3.70 2.90 3.70 5.60 6.40
Source: SALDRU (1994)
* Sample size too small for valid conclusion
Average travel times and costs have a racial component which reflects distance from potential
job markets and accessibility to modes of transportation. Table 3.2 breaks down transportation by mode,
which varies by race, with African and Colored groups using taxis (or minibuses) and walking, while
Whites and Indians primarily use private cars.
Combining travel modes with travel times and costs points to the fact that lower income
individuals have a difficult, and relatively more expensive commute in terms of total income than those
with higher incomes who make greater use of private transportation. It is far easier to drive for one hour
than it is to walk for one or two hours to work. From a utilitarian perspective, easing the commuting
constraint by improving access to public transportation will increase the welfare of low income
individuals who are more inclined to use the public transportation system.
Table 3.2: Modes of Transportation to/from Work by Race
(Percent)
Race Bus Taxi Train Bicycle Car Walk Other Total
African 12.8 32.0 5.6 1.1 8.1 39.9 0.3 100.0
Colored 6.0 26.4 13.0 1.3 25.7 27.5 0.0 100.0
Indian 16.4 6.4 0.3 0.3 67.7 8.9 0.0 100.0
White 5.1 0.4 1.8 1.2 82.0 8.6 1.0 100.0
All 10.4 23.2 5.5 1.1 29.2 30.2 0.4 100.0
Source: SALDRU (1994)
Public transportation in the Black areas is generally lacking, though this gap has to some extent
been filled by a relatively efficient and competitive taxi/minibus service to the townships. The use of
public buses vis-A-vis other modes of transportation is relatively low due partly to the significant lack of
bus service to low-income, especially squatter areas. The lack of public transportation is also
problematic in the sense that nationally over 30% percent of individuals in the economically active age
group are unemployed. Table 3.3 provides data on unemployment by race and broken down by urban,
rural and metropolitan area.
Table 3.3: Population (percent), and Unemployment Rates
All S.A. Metro Urban Rural African Colored Indian White
Population 100.0 26.1 20.5 53.3 76.1 2.60 8.5 12.8
Unemployment rate 12.9 13.1 11.3 13.7 16.0 15.2 7.8 3.3
Including discouraged 30.1 21.5 25.7 40.0 38.5 20.9 11.3 4.50
Source: SALDRU (1994)
The structure of cities affects the workings of urban land and housing markets in significant
ways, and it also imposes serious constraints on the functioning of the labor market. While whole-scale
rezoning may not be feasible, what is required is zoning which allows the establishment of commercial
activities within and close to squatter areas. Such a policy will contribute to formalizing what is a very
large and economically important informal sector. The informal sector has been estimated to be
anywhere from 20% to 40% of GDP (Fallon 1992 and CSS 1990). To this end the government may also
wish to create incentives to encourage economic activities to locate closer to the low income areas.
Improved economic opportunities and job creation will also have important effects on the willingness
and ability to pay for infrastructure services. The analysis thus far points to a situation where there are
rapidly growing urban squatter settlements which are not serviced, further complicated by the fact that
unemployment is rampant in these areas, thereby making potential cost-recovery very difficult.
A major constraint to the growth of commercial areas in deprived settlements is an often ignored
input into the production process, namely electricity. No data is available on the constraint this poses to
commercial enterprises wishing to locate in or near deprived settlements, but there is some data on
household access to electricity, which is indicative of the lack of access for low income groups. Table
3.4 shows the availability of electricity from the national grid for the various population groups. These
figures are illustrative of inequalities which exist in a country where resources are not necessarily as
scarce as they appear to be. This is perhaps most poignantly stated by Wilson and Ramphele (1989:
p.44) who observe that:
"...group(s) of elderly black women, each carrying home on her head a load of firewood weighing up to 50
kg, passing underneath the high-tension cables that carry the electric energy....of the Republic. South
Africa produces 60 per cent of the electricity in the entire continent yet almost two-thirds of the total
population (and approximately 80 per cent of all Africans) within the country do not have access to that
energy for their household requirements. Even in major cities whole townships are still erected without
provision for electricity being made."
Table 3.4: Access to Electricity from National Grid by Race
(Percent)
Total Pop African Colored Indian White
All S.A. 53.6 36.5 86.2 100.0 99.8
Metropolitan 84.5 66.7 95.7 100.0 100.0
Urban 64.0 42.3 75.9 100.0 99.6
Rural 28.4 25.6 71.4 100.0* 98.5
Source: SALDRU (1994)
* Sample size too small for valid conclusion
The deficiency of electricity means that individuals have to use other sources -- such as wood
and fossil fuels -- for energy, and candles for light. The cost of non-electric energy sources in terms of
money, and also time spent collecting these energy sources, far outweighs the cost of supplying
individual households with electricity. Granted, of course, the cost of connecting to the electricity grid
may be prohibitively expensive. However, as with water and sanitation, the negative externalities
associated with non-electric sources, and positive externalities and productivity effects which would
result from providing the infrastructure, imply that some form of government assistance beyond the local
authority may be called for. Through the MIIF the government has identified access to electricity supply
as a priority area, and is seeking to provide access to electricity to over 70% of all households by the year
2,000 (South Africa 1995a: p.21).
Another factor which would certainly affect the decision of industrial firms to locate in any area
is access to an adequate water supply. Again no detailed data is available on the constraint this variable
poses in the decision of industrial location, or the effects it may have on the welfare of the local
population, although access by households can be indicative of the water shortage in certain areas and
communities. Tables 3.5 shows access to water (by source) disaggregated by population group. Except
for Africans, all other groups have high degrees of access to piped water, either internal home connection
or piped yard tap.
Table 3.5: Access to Sources of Water by Race
(Percent)
Water Source All S.A. African Colored Indian White
Piped water-internal 81.4 17.5 78.9 99.2 99.7
Piped water-yard tap 11.9 25.8 16.5 0.8 0.2
Piped water-public kiosk 6.3 23.8 3.0 n.a. 0.1
Other 0.5 32.9 1.7 n.a. n.a.
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: SALDRU (1994)
n.a. = not available
The African population group obtains 33% of their water from other sources, presumably this
consists mostly of fetching water from natural sources. This group is also the only one to obtain water
from public kiosks; 24% of the SALDRU (1994) survey participants said they obtained water in this
manner, a number which is negligible for other groups as Table 3.5 shows. Of the 24% of Africans who
obtained water from public kiosks, 21.5% obtained it from a free public tap, while only 2.5% bought
water from a public tap.
Table 3.6 shows access to water by source for each province which contains major urban areas,
and the regional disparities are striking. The low incidence of piped internal water in Gauteng 6 is
probably due to the large concentration of squatter areas, which consist predominantly of informal
housing with no formal access to water and sanitation services. The MIIF preference is that on-site
household piped connections be encouraged as opposed to communal standpipes, which should only be
considered where there is a low level of ability to pay (South Africa 1995a: p.22). The reason for this
6 Gauteng is the new provincial name for the Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging (PWV) region.
preference is due to health externalities and time savings which would free up individuals to pursue other
economic activities.
Table 3.6: Access to Sources of Water by Province
(Percent)
Water Source All S.A. W. Cape Gauteng E. Cape KwaZulu
Piped water-internal 39.4 81.4 61.5 18.8 37.6
Piped water-yard tap 19.7 11.9 33.0 12.2 8.1
Piped water-public kiosk 17.3 6.3 5.2 20.0 16.7
Other 23.0 0.5 0.4 49.1 37.6
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: SALDRU (1994)
Related to the issue of water is access to sanitation services, particularly because a large
percentage of water consumed becomes waste. Table 3.7 shows access to sanitation services,
specifically toilets, broken down by metropolitan areas within four provinces.
Table 3.7: Access to Sanitation (toilets) by Metropolitan Area
(Percent)
All S.A. W. Cape Gauteng E. Cape KwaZulu
Flush toilet 83.0 64.7 88.0 76.1 69.2
Improved Pit Latrine 0.6 n.a 0.8 n.a n.a
Other Pit Latrine 6.4 n.a 5.4 n.a 30.8
Bucket toilet 6.9 30.3 2.2 23.9 n.a
Other toilet 1.5 n.a 2.0 n.a n.a
None 1.7 5.0 1.6 n.a n.a
Source: SALDRU (1994)
n.a. = not available
From Table 3.7 it appears that most of the population in metropolitan areas (83%) has access to
flush toilets, but it does not inform as to the need of rural areas and deprived urban (including
metropolitan) settlements, which is where investments into sanitation infrastructure will most likely be
required.
Unfortunately, the SALDRU (1994) survey data does not detail access to various types of toilets
by racial group, although it does have aggregate data by province. SALDRU (1994) does contain data
for Africans broken down by rural and urban areas, as shown in Table 3.8. The data in Table 3.8 is
suggestive of the backlog in sanitation, in the sense that it is most likely Africans located in the deprived
settlements who do not have access to sanitation services. Apartheid policies were to treat African urban
settlements as temporary, and not to invest into the infrastructure needs of this group (Manche 1994).
Table 3.8: Access to Sanitation (toilets) by Race
(Percent)
All S.A. African Colored Indian White
All Urban Rural
Flush toilet 83.0 34.2 55.9 13.1 89.0 100* 99.8
Improved Pit Latrine 0.6 1.6 2.0 1.8 n.a n.a n.a
Other Pit Latrine 6.4 41.2 13.3 59.7 n.a n.a n.a
Bucket toilet 6.9 6.5 24.5 1.4 n.a n.a n.a
Other toilet 1.5 0.5 0.6 0.1 n.a n.a n.a
None 1.7 16.0 3.7 23.9 n.a n.a n.a
Source: SALDRU (1994)
n.a. = not available
* Sample size too small for valid conclusion
The percentage of all Africans with access to full flush toilets is only 34%, while it is 89% for
Coloreds and 100% for Indians and Whites. For urban Africans this figure is higher at 56%, whereas it is
very low at 13% for rural Africans.
The analysis thus far has shown the backlog for the four different race groups and also showed
disparities across the major metropolitan areas and the provinces which contain these metropolitan areas.
The MIIF quantifies the backlog for the most deprived areas within the four major metropolitan areas as
these are the areas where the most investments required for addressing the backlog in infrastructure
services will have to occur.
Table 3.9 shows the number of people who live in deprived (low-income) settlements in the four
major metropolitan areas. All the figures are for 1992, and the infrastructure services covered are water,
sanitation, roads, storm drainage, and electricity.
Table 3.9: Number of People in Deprived Settlements and Service Levels, 1992
Cape Town Witwatersrand Port Elizabeth Durban Total % total
Informal
Unserviced 220,095 210,720 84,002 1,239,484 1,754,301 13.7
Partially Serviced 0 149,960 68,740 18,912 237,612 1.9
Formal
Partially Serviced 172,225 763,700 464,571 195,983 1,596,479 12.5
Fully Serviced 443,400 3,456,830 201,453 916,081 5,017,764 39.2
Deprived Areas 835,720 4,581,210 818,766 2,370,460 8,606,156 67.2
Other Metropolitan 1,421,280 1,546,800 265,689 962,672 4,196,441 32.8
Total Metropolitan 2,257,000 6,128,010 1,084,455 3,333,132 12,802,597 100.0
Source : South Africa (1994a), South Africa (1995a,b)
Approximately one-fifth of South Africa's population lives in deprived settlements. Table 3.9
shows that about 67% of residents in the four major metropolitan areas live in deprived low-income
settlements, with 14% living in informal settlements with no infrastructure services, and only 39% of
residents in deprived settlements are fully serviced.
Table 3.11 quantifies access to various levels of infrastructure services in the deprived
settlements of the four major metropolitan areas, and gives a more detailed breakdown of access to
specific infrastructure services. The levels of service provision are defined in Table 3.10.'
7 These definitions are also used by the World Bank and South Africa for calculating the costs of infrastructure
service provision.
Table 3.10: Infrastructure Levels of Service
Service Minimum Basic Intermediate Full
Water communal communal standpipe yard tap or tank house
standpipe within 250m walk connection
Sanitation buckets on site, e.g. VIP simple water-borne full water-
borne




Storm none open drains open drains piped drains
drains
Electricity none streetlights, 15-30 amps, 60 amps
perhaps 5 amps pre-paid meters house
connections
Source: South Africa (1995b)
The 1992 population figures were projected to mid-1995 by the MIIF assuming that the
population will grow at 3% per annum. The projected population figures were then used to calculate the
costs of addressing the infrastructure backlog. Delineating between minimum, basic, intermediate and
full levels of service allows the policy-maker to see not only how much it will cost to upgrade from
existing levels of service, but also how much it will cost to provide each level should a community and
its representative local government decide on a particular level of service (LOS). The decision of service
level will be based on ability to access finance, either through grants or loans, and the ability and
willingness of the community to pay for a given service level.
If the backlog in infrastructure provision is defined as those not enjoying the full level of service,
then the full level of service can be thought of as defining the upper bound of the infrastructure backlog
for a given service (Jackson 1996a). Likewise the backlog for lower levels of service can be thought of
in a similar manner, i.e. as those with less than that particular level of service. Those below the
minimum level of service would thus define the lower bound of the backlog.
Table 3.11: Access to Infrastructure Services in Deprived Settlements, 1992
(Number of People)
Cape Town Witwatersrand Port Elizabeth Durban Total % total
Water
Minimum 17,235 239,780 77,930 1,243,284 1,578,229 12.3
Basic 202,860 1,355,972 33,747 137,367 1,729,946 13.5
Intermediate 129,625 388,200 44,251 83,328 645,405 5.00
Full 486,000 2,597,258 662,838 906,481 4,652,577 36.2
Sanitation
Minimum 220,095 291,780 111,677 1,245,444 1,868,996 14.6
Basic 73,200 1,582,472 0 135,207 1,790,879 13.9
Intermediate 56,425 153,200 104,111 85,709 399,446 3.10
Full 486,000 2,553,758 602,978 904,100 4,546,836 35.4
Storm Drainage
Minimum 220,095 457,280 110,440 1,240,844 2,028,659 15.8
Basic 0 1,540,972 47,787 32,967 1,621,726 12.6
Intermediate 85,525 1,744,249 444,211 255,309 2,529,295 19.7
Full 530,100 838,709 216,328 841,340 2,426,477 18.9
Roads
Minimum 220,095 319,380 58,972 1,239,444 1,837,891 14.3
Basic 0 1,492,872 86,095 24,215 1,603,182 12.5
Intermediate 56,425 1,882,866 457,371 277,701 2,674,364 20.8
Full 559,200 886,092 216,328 829,100 2,490,720 19.4
Electricity
Minimum 220,095 349,640 195,077 1,147,430 1,912,242 14.9
Basic 115,800 1,363,612 395,240 129,395 2,004,047 15.6
Intermediate 59,352 661,515 27,121 180,309 928,271 7.20
Full 440,500 2,206,443 201,328 913,326 3,761,597 29.3
Population
Deprived Areas 835,720 4,581,210 818,766 2,370,460 8,606,156 67.2
Metropolitan 2,257,000 6,128,010 1,084,455 3,333,132 12,802,597 100.0
Source : South Africa (1994a), South Africa (1995a,b)
Chapter IV. Cost of Infrastructure Provision
Given the backlogs shown in the previous chapter, the South African Government (South Africa
1994a and 1995b) has calculated the cost of upgrading existing infrastructure to basic, intermediate and
full levels of service, and the cost of providing infrastructure services to new settlements (greenfield
developments). The cost of upgrading urban infrastructure' to the full level of service (LOS) was
estimated to be Rand 25,918 Million in 1995, which amounts to 5.1% of GDP, with bulk infrastructure
accounting for 28% of total costs in Port Elizabeth, 31% in Durban, 40% in Witwatersrand, and 65% in
Cape Town (South Africa 1995b).9 This produces a cost per beneficiary for upgrading of: R946 for
basic services, and R1,964 for full services. The average annual household per capita income was
calculated from the SALDRU (1994) survey to be R8,520 in mid-1993, and the Reserve Bank has GDP
per capita for 1993 at R9,196. The World Bank (1995) shows South Africa in 1993 to have a GNP per
capita of US$2,980 which, converted at that year's exchange rate, produces a GNP per capita of R9,735.
Table 4.1 shows average annual household per capita income data disaggregated by race and province
containing a major metropolitan area. The income disparities suggest that those who need the
infrastructure services the most will least likely be able to afford them. Upgrading to the full
infrastructure level of service is equivalent to about half the annual household per capita income'* of
Africans, while the basic level of service will be roughly a quarter of their income. It therefore seems
unlikely that even the basic level of infrastructure will be affordable to the poorest groups of the
population, unless they are allowed to borrow, via their local authorities or governments, or receive
grants from the central government to help finance new infrastructure services.
8 The infrastructure services covered are water, sanitation, roads, storm drainage, and electricity. The needs for
combinations of these services will, of course, vary across communities, thereby altering the costs.
9 These estimates are in 1995 Rands and based on 1995 population projections.
10 These figures are consistent with real income growth of 2 to 3% p.a. between mid-1993 and end-1995.
Table 4.1: Average Annual Household Per Capita Income by Race and
(Rand)
All S.A. African Colored Indian White
W. Cape 9,840 4,968 6,396 19,752* 26,064
E. Cape 2,568 2,220 3,624 n.a. 19,428
KwaZulu 3,600 2,520 9,264 10,896 26,976
Gauteng 11,796 6,360 11,412 17,328 30,900
All S.A. 8,520 3,864 6,444 12,060 28,584
Source: SALDRU (1994)
n.a. = not available
* Sample size too small for valid conclusion
Province, 1993
A more detailed breakdown of upgrading costs by service level is given in Table 4.2. The total
cost of infrastructure provision includes the costs for land, institutional development, design, and price
and physical contingencies.
Table 4.2: Estimated Cost of Urban Infrastructure Service Provision
(Million Rand, 1995 prices)
Basic Intermediate Full
Metropolitan Cities
Upgrading 1,929 3,810 10,957
New Sites 568 980 1,498
Bulk Infrastructure 3,087 3,087 3,087
Total Metropolitan 6,680 8,973 16,624
All Urban Areas
Upgrading 5,986 10,088 25,918
New Sites 1,125 1,941 2,940
Bulk Infrastructure 7,215 7,215 7,215
Total All Urban 16,067 20,985
Total Cost 21,249 27,753 50,009
Source: South Africa (1994a), South Africa (1995a,b)
The total cost of infrastructure upgrading and bulk/new infrastructure (greenfield developments)
delivery for the full level of services is expected to be R50 Billion (US$13.8bn)," which amounts to
10.3% of GDP. This is consistent with South Africa (1995a: p.36) which estimates that the backlog in
infrastructure is approximately 5-9 of GDP depending on level of service delivery. This figure for
upgrading and providing new infrastructure amounted to R21bn (US$5.8bn) or 4.4% of GDP for basic
service levels, and R27bn (US$7.4bn) or 5.5% of GDP for intermediate service levels. Financial
resources thus represent the most significant binding constraints on infrastructure investments.
Preliminary estimates by the World Bank (1 994b) suggest that a real growth rate of 3% per
annum will allow the macroeconomy to sustain annual public investment of 1.7% of GDP. Given the
cost estimates of R25bn for upgrading and R50bn for upgrading and new infrastructure to the full service
levels, it would be impossible, in both financial and practical implementation terms, to eliminate the
backlog in one year. These costs are based on existing need to eliminate the backlog and do not make
provisions for future population growth (South Africa 1995a). If anticipated future demand is included
the cost of infrastructure provision would increase to R44-89bn, with basic and full levels determining
the lower and upper bounds. Even meeting the basic level of services in one year would require an
expenditure (or investment) equal to about 4.4% of GDP. Phased over five years, investments to meet
the intermediate standard of services in urban infrastructure would represent 0.68% of GDP per annum
and 40% of aggregate public investment, and phased over eight years it would account for 0.42% of GDP
and 25% of public investment (World Bank 1994b); calculations which are consistent with
macroeconomic constraints. While Ahmad (1994) does not spell out the model he uses to calculate these
macroeconomic consistent infrastructure expenditures, it is safe to assume that he utilizes the macro-
econometric model developed in Fallon and Pereira da Silva (1994). The figures, though, are indicative
of the magnitude of the problem. Various government reports (South Africa 1994a, 1995a, 1995b, 1996)
propose that the urban infrastructure program be implemented over a period of ten years, and estimates
The 1995 exchange rate was 3.627 Rand per US Dollar.
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that given favorable economic conditions" a capital investment program of R60-70bn would be feasible
for the five services outlined above.
A. Shortcomings of the MIIF Cost Calculations
The analyses of the MIIF and the various World Bank studies do not consider technologies other
than those described in Table 3.10. For example, sanitation services such as the condominial type sewer
system could be an option. Experience in Brazil has shown that condominial sewers are much cheaper
than traditional systems in both installation and maintenance costs (Watson 1995). In fact, with all its
emphasis on financial assessments, it is surprising that none of the numerous World Bank reports even
mention the condominial sewer system as a viable option for South African squatter settlements. It may
be the case that the condominial system may not be feasible given the political-economy of South Africa,
where the expectation may be that the government should provide high levels of service.
The MIIF does point out that the marginal cost of higher levels of sanitation services, such as full
waterborne sewerage, significantly outweighs the marginal economic benefit as compared to low cost
alternatives, such as on-site systems, where marginal benefits will exceed the marginal costs (South
Africa 1995: p.22). Thus, at the margin, the ratio of benefits to costs of money spent on low levels of
sewerage is positive and much higher than that of full service levels, which may have very low or even
negative economic returns. In terms of maximizing economic benefits it could be argued that resources
should be allocated in such a way that the marginal benefit of receiving a service should equal the
marginal cost of providing it (Zerbe and Dively 1994). In the case of infrastructure projects, the level of
service chosen should be one that minimizes the discrepancy between marginal benefits and costs, with
benefits exceeding costs, as it is unlikely, given the "lumpy" nature of the investment, that the two can be
equated.
1 This means growth of real GDP no less than 3% p.a. with low and stable inflation rates.
Another shortcoming in the cost estimates by both the World Bank and the South African
government is that they do not detail the materials (PVC, concrete, etc.) to be used in the case of water
and sanitation infrastructure projects, since these services are more amenable than others to different
types of technologies. Nor is it clear exactly how the costs are calculated, what the specifications of the
inputs are, such as water and sewerage pipe diameters, and how costs change with various pipe sizes and
materials. Other infrastructure services will, of course, use other variables, and in the case of roads, for
example, road width would be considered. Issues of materials used for inputs and design layout are
discussed in Kalbermatten, et al (1980) and Lauria (1994). It is also unclear how the special interests of
groups and other political-economy issues, as outlined in Angel (1985), are taken into account, if at all,
and how these variables will affect infrastructure costs.
A model which may be a very useful tool of analysis, but which has not yet been applied to the
South African situation, is the Bertaud model (Bertaud et al 1988). This is an integrated model which can
simulate the effect changes in material costs, design layout, and other relevant variables are likely to
have on project costs. It also provides an integrated framework which allows the planner to incorporate
other costs, such as land, housing, etc. As such, it can be perceived as a general equilibrium model for
housing and infrastructure investment projects. Like any other model, the Bertaud model does have its
shortcomings, but it nevertheless provides a useful and systematic way of simulating and assessing the
effects changes in project design have on overall costs. The Development Bank of Southern Africa and
the Water Resources Commission are in the process of developing a computer-based financial model to
test infrastructure investment plans for their long-term feasibility (Jackson 1996 a,b). No details
regarding the model or its structure are available at this time, but it differs from the Bertaud model,
which may provide a more integrative approach, in the sense that it can be linked to other aspects of
spatial planning, such as the development of land and housing markets.
Chapter V. Local Governments and Infrastructure Provision
The devolution of powers to local governments in South Africa as outlined in the constitution
and various other documents and laws (such as the LGTA) seeks to encourage an "integrated planning
approach" as suggested by the "Reconstruction and Development Programme". The RDP proposes a
conceptual framework for meeting the country's dual objectives of rapid economic growth coupled with
poverty eradication (RDP 1995, South Africa 1994b). The link between the RDP and the urban
infrastructure delivery strategy (the MIIF) is apparent from their focus on basic needs, although the RDP
is more comprehensive and the MIIF can be seen as a subset of the RDP. The need for strengthening
local governments is also clear given that they are primarily responsible for meeting infrastructure needs
and addressing the backlog in infrastructure service delivery to the poor.
A. Role of Local Government in MIIF
The constitution stipulates that local governments should provide services in an "equitable and
sustainable" manner (section 155(4)) and ensure that priority in service delivery is given to meeting the
"basic needs of the community" (section 153(a)). This is consistent with the principles put forth by the
RDP (1994) in the sense that it seeks to secure a sustainable growth path which provides services in an
efficient (cost-minimizing) manner while meeting objectives of equity and poverty alleviation.
In terms of the MIIF, local governments have to assume prime responsibility for the delivery of
infrastructure services, and are to ensure that all costs are recovered locally in order to pay for such
services. At the same time, infrastructure services should be provided in accordance with levels of
affordability by local communities (South Africa 1996). Criteria of willingness to pay and affordability
are to be given serious consideration by LGs as the central government wishes to avoid a system of long-
term subsidization, especially of current expenditures. It is expected that LGs should be able to finance
operations and maintenance (O&M) expenditures through local revenue generation, i.e. either through
local taxes or by collecting user fees, or both. As for capital expenditures, some grants/subsidies will be
forthcoming from the central government, mostly to ensure that all LGs can at least provide a basic level
of service to their communities. On the whole, though, LGs are expected to borrow to finance
infrastructure investment and to repay loans from own-revenue sources.
B. Local Government Revenue and Expenditure
The ability of local governments to generate revenue and improve expenditure allocations is
important as it will influence their success in meeting infrastructure needs. It will also provide an
indication as to the types of policies that will be required to strengthen LGs and their supporting
institutions which are responsible for service delivery.
It is difficult to draw comparisons between pre- and post-Apartheid local government revenue
and expenditure shares in the total government because the definition of what constitutes a local
government has changed dramatically, as is evident from Chapter II. Also, prior to 1994, official
statistics only reported numbers for the WLAs (which included MCs), and data for BLAs (RSCs and the
homelands) were reported separately and were almost always unreliable.
The fact that BLAs relied heavily on grant transfers from the central government will serve to
distort the reality as to the importance of local governments before 1994. WLAs had various sources of
revenue generation, with service fees and property taxes playing very important roles. As Africans were
not allowed to own property in Apartheid urban South Africa, property taxes as a source of revenue were
not available to BLAs. The lack of service provision in African areas also meant that revenue from
service (user) fees was small or absent. The revenue shortage was exacerbated by the rent and service
fee boycotts in townships as forms of protest against what were considered illegitimate BLAs.
It is only since 1994, with the amalgamation of the LAs of all population groups, that a more
accurate picture of the share of local government in the economy can be attained. This is especially true
since the new LAs are increasingly encouraged to raise their own revenue, while decreasing their
reliance on grant transfers from higher tiers of government.
Local governments represent about 10-14 percent of total government expenditure, depending on
whether transfers from higher tiers of government are included. This indicates a reasonable degree of
decentralization with regard to expenditure. A committee known as KIFVSA investigated South
Africa's intergovernmental fiscal relations in the early 1990s (South Africa 1992). It projected that
under a scenario of maximum devolution, local government expenditure as a share of total government
expenditure would increase from about I %" to roughly 40%. On the other hand, the share of central
government expenditure in total government expenditure could potentially decrease from 60% to 45%,
and for provincial governments the corresponding figure would go from 29% to 16%. The figures are
summarized in Table 5.1.
Table 5.1: Revenue and Expenditure Shares of Government Tiers
(Percent)
Expenditure Revenue
1992 1996* Devolved 1992 1996* Devolved Devolved with
Revenue Sharing
Local 10.9 10.6 39.5 7.9 12.0 11.5 18.0
Provincial 28.5 41.2 15.9 9.4 46.4 12.9 21.6
Central 60.6 n.a. 44.6 82.7 n.a. 75.6 60.5
Source: South Africa (1992) and South African Reserve Bank Quarterly Bulletin
n.a. = not available
* As percent of General Government
The KIFVSA committee also found that revenue shares of local governments in a fully devolved
system would increase from 8% to 11.5%, and this figure rose to 18% once revenue sharing and grant
transfers were taken into consideration. The revenue accruing to provincial governments would increase,
whereas the revenue share of the central government would decrease. It should be noted, though, that the
13 This figure is for 1992, but calculations for 1996 places it at about the same level. i.e. 11%.
figures for provincial governments are not very reliable, as can be seen by comparing 1996 to 1992 data.
The reason for this is that the 1996 data is for the newly defined provinces which include the homelands
and SGTs; these were excluded prior to 1994.
The data shows that expenditures of local governments would increase by much more than
revenue as a share of total government, implying that the revenue bases of local governments are very
limited, especially in the short run; that is, local tax bases are limited and probably not very buoyant in
yield. The implication is that in order to finance infrastructure services LGs will have to tap into other
sources of finance, such as loans and/or grants, to overcome their budgetary constraints. Table 5.2
breaks down the revenue sources of local and provincial governments.
Table 5.2: Income of Local Governments and Provincial Governments
(Percent of Total)
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Local Governments
Total Revenue & Grants 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Total Revenue 0.81 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.80 0.80 0.81 0.87
Tax Revenue 0.26 0.30 0.30 0.32 0.34 0.39 0.38 0.39
Non-Tax Revenue 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.48 0.45 0.40 0.42 0.46
Capital Revenue 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02
Grants 0.19 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.20 0.20 0.19 0.13
Provincial Governments
Total Revenue & Grants 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Total Revenue 0.16 0.14 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.13 0.07
Tax Revenue 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.09 0.07 0.01
Non-Tax Revenue 0.09 0.07 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.05 0.06 0.06
Grants 0.84 0.86 0.84 0.84 0.85 0.85 0.87 0.93
Source: South African Reserve Bank Quarterly Bulletin
Table 5.2 shows that provincial governments are much more dependent on grants transfers than
are local governments. Grants historically constituted slightly less than 20% of the income of local
governments, and were placed at 13% in 1996. For provincial governments, grant allocation in the past
contributed about 85% to their total income, and was over 90% in 1996. The projected grant allocation
to the provinces is estimated to be 95% for the 1997 fiscal year (Ministry of Finance 1997). Taxes are
important sources of revenues for local governments, but are a small part of provincial revenues. Non-
tax revenues, which include user fees and service charges, exhibit similar patterns. In fact, tax revenues
for LGs have increased from 26% in 1989 to about 40% in 1996, whereas non-tax revenues have taken a
slight fall over the same period. Tax revenues for provincial governments have fallen from 7% in 1989
to a negligible 1% in 1996, and non-tax revenues have also declined from 9% in 1989 to 6% in 1996.
Table 5.3: Expenditure of Local and Provincial Governments
(Percent of Total)
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Local Governments
Total Expenditure 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Current Expenditure 0.57 0.68 0.69 0.63 0.66 0.67 0.68 0.72
Capital Expenditure 0.43 0.32 0.31 0.37 0.34 0.33 0.32 0.28
Provincial Governments
Total Expenditure 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Current Expenditure 0.86 0.87 0.89 0.92 0.94 0.92 0.93 0.93
Capital Expenditure 0.14 0.13 0.11 0.08 0.06 0.08 0.07 0.07
Source: South African Reserve Bank Quarterly Bulletin
Table 5.3 breaks down local and provincial government expenditure into its current and capital
components, showing the percent of each expenditure item in the particular tier of government's total
expenditure. Current expenditures form a larger share of provincial government expenditure than for
those of local governments. Local governments allocate on the order of a third of their expenditures to
capital expenditure, whereas provincial governments have been allocating less than 10% since 1992.
The data in Tables 5.2 and 5.3 point to a system where local governments, which are responsible for
infrastructure service delivery, have greater revenue bases than provincial governments and where LGs
also rely less on grant transfers from the central authorities.
C. Short Run Infrastructure Delivery Programs
The above analysis suggests a situation in which local governments will not be able to raise
enough revenue to cover expenditures, especially if large investments in infrastructure are needed. This
budgetary constraint can in part be overcome by borrowing money from the private markets, thereby
allowing LGs to allocate the consumption and expenditure patterns of their constituents intertemporally.
However, the ability of different LGs to borrow will vary widely depending on their fiscal strength and
the income of the communities they serve. While different LGs will borrow from different sources,
some form of grant support will be required to meet objectives of equity, if not to kick-start urban
infrastructure investment. In order to get the urban infrastructure investment program underway, and to
avoid waiting until all long-term issues regarding infrastructure service delivery have been sorted out, the
central government has begun to initiate some programs. These are mostly in the form of subsidies and
grant transfers to infrastructure investment projects in targeted areas.
The major initiatives started and implemented by the central government to make funds available
to LGs are: the Masakhane Campaign, the Municipal Infrastructure Extension Program (MIEP), Special
Integrated (Presidential) Projects (SIPs), and the Bulk and Connector Infrastructure Grant Program
(BCIG). A brief description of each program is provided below.
The Masakhane Campaign" was launched in February 1995 to address issues of broad
community development. Two of its foci are accelerated municipal service delivery, and ensuring that
users pay for the services that they consume (South Africa 1996). LGs are responsible for implementing
the campaign, and it stresses that communities be educated on issues such as LG revenue and
expenditure patterns, the importance of paying for services, and the various levels of services and
associated costs. A major objective of the program is to enhance the capacity of LAs to provide and
4 Masakhane is a Nguni word meaning "let us build each other" (South Africa 1996).
administer housing and infrastructure services. The process was launched by the RDP Ministry and the
Department of Housing with R850 million channeled to LAs through the MIEP.
Municipal Infrastructure Extension Program (MIEP) is located in the Department of
Constitutional Development and is generally run by the RDP Office. The objective is to provide LAs
and communities with expert support teams to aid them with the preparation of business plans when
applying for funding from this program (South Africa 1995a). The expert support teams are usually
from institutions such as the Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA) and/or private consultants.
Bulk and Connector Infrastructure Grant Program (BCIG) is located in the Department of
Housing, and the RDP Office is responsible for technical oversight of the program. Using the same
formula as the housing subsidy, funds are allocated to the provinces. The provinces in turn receive
applications for infrastructure projects from LGs, and are responsible for allocating money to selected
projects. As of mid-1996 this program was not yet implemented (DOF 1996).
Special Integrated (Presidential) Projects (SIPs) were announced by the president shortly after
the new government came to power, and are intended to kick-start development in highly visible areas,
focusing on violence-torn and crisis-ridden communities (South Africa 1996). These are once-off
projects aimed at immediate delivery, and are intended to set precedents for service delivery and
community participation. Funding allocations for SIPs are centrally determined based on perceived
national priorities, unlike the previous three initiatives which are driven by LG proposals. DOF (1996)
argues that relative to MIEPs, the SIPs have performed poorly, although it is not clear how success is
measured, especially since the initiatives have different objectives.
In addition to these programs, the government has also begun to implement its Housing Program
which targets subsidies to end-users rather than LGs, and seeks to sustain housing delivery at 350,000
units p.a. within five years (South Africa 1996). The subsidies vary by household income, with lower
income households qualifying for greater subsidies. The housing subsidy is intended to be a once-off
capital amount per household, with households given as much discretion as possible on how to spend the
subsidy (South Africa 1995a: p.60). The MIIF proposes a requirement that at least 40% of the housing
subsidy be spent on infrastructure at site and project level if the MIIF is to be viable and sustainable
(DOF 1996: p.6).
The DOF (1996: p.9) report highlighted the fact that double subsidization is emerging as an
increasingly important problem, as the initiatives outlined above often overlap. For example, households
receiving a housing subsidy, which are also located in a local government that is receiving project-level
infrastructure subsidies/grants through the MIEP, benefit more than others where there are only one of
these initiatives in place. Similar effects could occur in areas where there are overlaps between any of
the other initiatives (such as MIEP and BCIG). There is a clear need to coordinate subsidy and grant
allocation to ensure not only that resources are not wasted, but also that there is equity in the way funds
are allocated to households and LGs. The current grant allocation system for infrastructure investment is
poorly coordinated due to a lack of conscious design (DOF 1996).
The current system is short-term in nature and implementation problems such as these can
perhaps be expected and tolerated. The national government needs to ensure that a system which seeks
to have an efficient long-term infrastructure investment financing mechanism not suffer from the same
drawbacks as current initiatives. What is needed is a system in which grants for infrastructure
investment are linked to the ability of local governments to borrow and raise revenue through either cost-
recovery or taxes. The next chapter will outline a methodology for thinking about the manner in which
grants and loans can be linked when financing capital expenditures for infrastructure projects.
Chapter VI. Grant-Loan Linkages and Infrastructure Investment
Finance
The huge capital outlays associated with infrastructure projects, and the limits of local
governments' current revenue, mean that these projects cannot be financed solely through the local tax
base and user fees. Local governments will thus have to borrow money from outside sources, such as the
private capital markets or development banks, and the issue then becomes how much money can be
borrowed, for which projects, and what the terms of the loans should be.
Infrastructure projects have both equity and efficiency objectives and meeting them often
requires using more than one financing method. The set of financing methods used will depend on the
type of project and the individuals affected by the project. It is important to know which set of financing
methods needs to be used in order to assess the costs and benefits to all affected groups, and thus of the
project as a whole. In this chapter the vector financing method (VFM) is developed to enable the
selection of financing alternatives for projects of varying size given the characteristics of the local
government responsible for the project's implementation. The intent of this method is to explicitly link
the use of intergovernmental grants and private loans in order to encourage equity while meeting
efficiency criteria.
A. Intergovernmental Grants and Local Government Loan Sources
Intergovernmental grant transfers play a central role in all countries' fiscal policy (World Bank
1994a). Grants from central (or provincial) to local governments will play an important role in South
Africa, not least because of the need to address the backlog in infrastructure services. Stability of LG
expenditures requires that grant flows to LGs be predictable and transparent. A brief synopsis of the four
main types of grant transfers, and their anticipated impacts, is given here.
First, grants may be conditional or unconditional. Conditional grants are given to LGs for
expenditure on an assigned item/function specified by the higher tier of government." The LG is
committed to spend the grant money on a pre-assigned function, such as health, education, water, etc.
The purpose of conditional grants is to alter relative prices, making the targeted service cheaper relative
to other services. Unconditional grants are given to the recipient LG to spend in any manner it deems
appropriate, and is thus tantamount to shifting the budget line of the LG parallel outwards, and hence has
no effect on the relative prices of various services delivered by the LG. "
In addition to being conditional or unconditional, grants may also be lump-sum (block) or
matching transfers. Block grants are fixed sums transferred to the recipient LG, and matching grants
reward the recipient LG for additional money it raises or spends. Matching grants can also be tied to the
amount of money LGs borrow. In terms of conventional theory, block grants can be thought of as
shifting the budget line in a parallel fashion, while matching grants pivot the budget line, that is they
alter relative prices as perceived by the LG. Four types of general grants can thus be distinguished,
namely conditional and unconditional, which can be either matching or non-matching.
Unconditional block grants are used to allow lower tiers of government to share in central
government tax revenues. This is to capture scale economies and efficiency effects (cost-minimizing)
the central government has in collecting certain taxes, such as the income tax. Unconditional block
transfers are to ensure that lower tiers of government have sufficient financial resources to pursue their
constitutional assigned responsibilities (World Bank 1994a).
Unconditional matching grants are used to equalize fiscal (tax) capacity, usually across sub-
national governments (provinces). The focus of these grants is on provincial equalization, and provinces
with lower tax capacity receive greater sums (FFC 1995, 1996, Inman 1996, McClure 1994), but they
may also be used to ensure fiscal fairness among taxpayers in different local governments.
15 The higher tier of government can be either the province or the center. Here it is assumed to be the center.
16 For discussions on the effects of various grants using economic theory, see Shah (1994) and Schroeder (1988).
Conditional lump-sum (block) grants are intended to allow LGs (or provinces) to meet at least
the basic needs of their residents. Targeted block grants can, in South Africa for example, be used to
subsidize infrastructure investments up to the basic LOS, and hence to ensure that all LGs can provide
their residents with at least the basic level of infrastructure services.
Conditional matching grants are best used for encouraging infrastructure investment and
expenditures above the basic level, and could be used in a grant loan-linkage system. These grants
should be used on projects with a demonstrated high rate of return (World Bank 1994a), and where
externalities may result in the LG not investing in infrastructure to the degree required, or when they may
not invest at all (Inman 1996). In the case of infrastructure investments, the grants to use in this category
would be capital project grants, which are demand driven in the sense that they rely on the submission of
proposals by LGs and feasibility studies. This builds on and is consistent with some of the government
initiatives mentioned in the previous chapter. It is expected that project grants, while administratively
more complex than block grants, will more likely result in productive infrastructure investments (Bahl
and Linn 1992).
The public finance literature usually focuses on the effect which grants may have on the tax
effort of the LG, and it is argued that grant systems should be structured so as to encourage local tax
collection efforts and not dampen them (Bahl and Linn 1992, Smoke 1989). While effects on tax efforts
are important, the concern here is with the impact grants may have on LGs' willingness to borrow from
private sources.
Much less information is available on loan sources to LGs than grant allocation mechanisms,
such as the ones outlined above. In South Africa, loans will be forthcoming from predominantly three
sources: bond issues, commercial bank loans, and the Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA).
Not much can be said about these loan sources, and this area requires much more research. The
conditions of loans will vary between various types of projects and LGs. Bond issues will only be
possible within the financially strong LGs, such as the major metropolitan areas, and mostly for projects
which are revenue generating. Commercial banks and long-term institutional investors, such as pension
funds, may also choose to hold equity in municipal bond issues. This is the case in the recent R500m ten
year bond issue by Infrastructure Investment Corp, trading as Inca, in which there were 23 investors
"ranging from large institutions to small pension funds." (Hazelhurst 1997). DBSA loans will be of a
concessionary nature, and will be to LGs which are considered "unacceptably high risks" by private
financial markets (DBSA 1996). These will be the poorest LGs, most notably those in the former
homelands and SGTs, but also the small town LGs.
B. Rationale for Grant-Loan Linkages
Infrastructure projects require large scale up-front investments. These fixed costs imply "front-
end capital formations" which tend to strain even the most developed public finance systems of the
industrialized nations, and even well-rated public utilities often have problems funding debt over long
periods of time (Kirwam 1989). The limits of local government revenue generating capacity in the short
run suggest that they will not be able to finance infrastructure investments in a "pay-as-you-go" manner,
but will have to resort to borrowing from the private sector to meet investment needs. This makes good
economic sense as it allows intertemporal allocation of the consumption of infrastructure services." In
addition, loans also impose fiscal discipline on LGs, thereby encouraging them to implement projects in
an efficient" manner. Local government borrowing may facilitate long-term development goals by
broadening and deepening capital markets, thereby allowing financial markets to serve as reliable and
efficient conduits for future infrastructure investment finance (World Bank 1994c).
17 See Rothenberg (1992) for a general discussion on intertemporal substitution.
18 Efficiency is defined as technical efficiency where services are provided at minimum average cost, and
economic efficiency where the services delivered reflect the preferences of the users.
However, even when capital markets work fairly well, as is the case in South Africa,'9 certain
local governments may not have access to loans, or they may not get loans in the amounts they need.
Even if they have access to loans via a development bank, such as the DBSA, they may not be able to
assume high levels of debt. This will be especially true in poorer LGs, but can also be the case if a
project is to be implemented by a LA whose residents have low income levels, even if this LA is located
within a financially strong LG. This may be the case, for example in metropolitan areas, such as Cape
Town or Johannesburg, where there exist LAs with very low income communities.
In cases where access to capital markets, or high debt levels, pose a barrier to investing in
infrastructure, use could be made of intergovernmental grant transfers. Grant transfers may create
disincentives for LGs to mobilize their own resources. One way around this problem would be to link
grant transfers to local revenue generation (Schroeder 1992). Such a policy, however, may create an
open-ended grant transfer system and introduce uncertainties in the central government budget as it may
not be sure how much local revenue will be generated, and thus how much money should be transferred
to LGs. It may also create a system of continuous grant flows to LGs from the center, which will serve
to limit the fiscal autonomy of LGs, thereby reducing the impacts of devolution.
What is needed is a system in which grant transfers are once-off and where LGs do not rely on
them extensively in the long run. In terms of meeting both equity and efficiency objectives it would be
prudent for the central authorities to provide once-off subsidies (grants) to assist with capital
expenditures, but place the responsibility of current expenditures or operations and maintenance (O&M)
costs with LGs. Such a system encourages local revenue generation through cost-recovery schemes, and
in the case of non-revenue generating infrastructure, such as roads and storm drainage, it provides
incentives for greater utilization of the local tax base. As it does not interfere with tariff structures or
subsidize the interest at which LGs borrow, efficiency in resource allocation is not necessarily deterred.
19 South Africa is reported by the IFC (1996) as having a stock market capitalization of US$280.5 billion, which is
the largest among emerging economies, followed by Malaysia with US$222.7 billion.
Incentives to over-invest are potentially removed as the interest rate at which LGs borrow reflects the
true cost of capital, and the constraint to keep capacity within affordable limits is reinforced by the fact
that most O&M costs have to be borne by local governments. Problems of subsidized interest and
continuous grant allocations were pervasive in many Municipal Development Funds (MDFs), and often
the distinction between grants and loans was blurred, with loans frequently being converted into grants
(Ferguson 1993). This problem was partly due to the fact that grants and loans were being disbursed by
the same entity.
In order to encourage investment in infrastructure services, grant transfers to LGs should be
linked to more than just local revenue generating initiatives. Smoke (1996) proposes that
intergovernmental grants should be linked to LG borrowing from the capital markets or development
banks. Grants may enable LGs to borrow more money to finance higher levels of service which may not
be feasible in the absence of grant transfers. Grants would thus serve to ensure that debt service is kept
within reasonable and affordable limits, and used where local revenue may not be enough to cover loan
payments in the absence of grants (Ichsan 1995). In cases where debt service may be reasonable, LGs
may wish to use grants as leverage for securing better interest rates on loans. This could be especially
useful in metropolitan areas where bond issues are plausible. Bond issues would generally allow the LG
to obtain better interest rates than if the money were borrowed from a commercial bank. However, if
there are many low income LAs, as is the case in the metropolitan areas, LGs may be limited in their
ability to issue revenue bonds and may have to resort increasingly to issuing general obligation bonds,
causing the tax base to be over-extended.20 In cases such as these, LAs may qualify for grant transfers,
but the LG may be financially strong enough to issue bonds or borrow through other avenues.
Disparities within urban areas may justify grant transfers even to better-off LGs, especially if they have
many poor LAs within their jurisdiction.
20 Revenue bonds tie debt repayments to the revenue stream of a project, whereas general obligation bonds uses the
tax base of the LG as collateral.
Table 6.1 below presents a typology of loan financing options which may be available for
different types of LGs, as defined in Table 2.1, for the five infrastructure services listed in the MIIF. The
loan financing options are indicative of what may be available to each LG for a given project, although
loan financing options will vary depending on the LOS of the infrastructure, as will grant assistance.
Table 6.1: Typology of Loan Financing Options for Local Governments by Infrastructure
Bonds Commercial Commercial Bonds Bonds
Commercial Commercial Commercial
Bonds Commercial Commercial Commercial Bonds
Commercial Commercial
Commercial DBSA DBSA DBSA Commercial
DBSA DBSA
Grants
DBSA N/A N/A N/A DBSA
-- 1'4UL tPP1[U4A1I
Table 6.1 illustrates loan funding sources which may be available for various LGs and for
different projects. For example, a large metropolitan area, given its financial resources, may be able to
issue revenue bonds in order to finance private household piped-water connections, or individual
household electricity connections. Cost-recovery capacity for these services is high and the revenue
collected from service delivery can act as collateral for the loan. The same is true for toll roads. Non-
revenue generating services such as regular roads, storm-drainage, or sanitation services, may not lend
themselves as easily to bond issues. The LG could issue general obligation bonds, which use the tax
base as collateral. The LG may of course choose to use unconditional block grants as collateral,
assuming that the bond issuing entity (or bond-holder) has recourse to such flows should the LG not be
able to make scheduled loan repayments.
At the other extreme, the LGs of small towns will not be able to issue bonds, and their ability to
borrow from commercial banks (or commercial bank consortia) will be very limited, if not an
impossibility, especially for services which do not generate revenue. These LGs will rely mostly on
grant transfers, and will seek concessionary loans from the DBSA. It is unlikely that these LGs will be
able to invest much above the basic level of services, and if they could do so, it would be for electricity
and perhaps water. For example, providing communal standpipes would generate no revenue, and would
in any event allow the LG to qualify for a conditional block grant. It is in LGs which are neither strong
enough to issue bonds nor weak enough to qualify for total grant assistance where a combination of
grants and loans have to be used to facilitate infrastructure service delivery. Even so, it may be good
practice to have even poor LGs (and LAs) borrow small amounts from the DBSA in order to create a
"culture" of borrowing and debt management among all local governments. Experience with specialized
infrastructure banks, such as the DBSA, has not been successful in all countries. An exception is
Brazil's National Housing Bank (NHB) which has been fairly successful and is said to perform with
remarkable efficiency (Azzad and Jacobs 1986). The NHB lends to the state (provincial) level, and has
lent $6 billion over the last fifteen years for programs that have delivered water and sewerage systems to
more than 60 million people.
C. Vector Financing Method
The vector financing method (VFM) developed here is based on a methodology designed by
Rothenberg (1996) to assess benefits and costs of projects. The details of the model are displayed in
Matrices 6.1 and 6.2, and its application to financing infrastructure projects will be discussed next. The
decision rule will be based on a vector description of financing2' options, which can be represented as:
(1) F = [(FI), (F2).....(F)]
2 Rothenberg (1996) develops his model to assess the benefits and costs of coastal zone management, and has
policy options as his decision variable.
where F is the vector of financing options such as loans from various sources or different types of grant
transfers, and (Fi) is also a vector representing varying degrees of financing options available; that is:
(2) (Fi)= (Fil, Fi2
.
,-Fim) V i = I to n
where each Fi (j=1 to m) is a financing option of differing size; that is, each Fij could represent different
sizes of loans and grant transfers to the local government from various sources.
Matrix 6.1: Project Options (P) and Type of Local Government (G)
P1  P 2  etc. ... Pn
G1 F 11  F 1 2  ... F 11
G2  F12  F22  ... F2n
etc.... 
... ... I... ...
Gm Fim F2m ... Fmn
Each financing option will be associated with a certain type and size of project (Pi) and type and
size of local government (G) as shown in Matrix 6.1. Financing options F will be presented for each
project (type of infrastructure and level of service), and urban local government (metropolitan or other).22
Each cell in Matrix 6.1 consists of a financing vector which can itself be broken down into its vector
components, as shown in Matrix 6.2. The vector components of the F vector may once again consist of
vector components.
Thus, the first step is to identify the characteristic of the local government and the type and size
of project which is to be implemented. Each Gj will have associated with it variables such as type of
urban area, population, income, revenue base (tax and non-tax), etc., and each Pi will be a different
project such as water supply, sanitation services, electrification, road provision, etc. The size of the
project will of course depend on the size of the population to be served, and the level of service (LOS)
for which the LG, after consultation with its constituents, has opted.
Reference is made here to urban LGs as this is the focus of the current investigation, although the analysis could
easily be extended to rural LGs.
The next step is to obtain information on each financing option (Fi) pertaining to each project Pi
and each local government G. This will allow for the development of financing option vectors (Fi) based
on the characteristics of the project (Pi) and the local government (G). The variables which make up Gj
will be important in determining the sources of funding, Si, which may be available for a given project Pi.
The financing vector (F) will thus be given by:
(3) F [PI, P2,. ---Pb, Gb+I, Gb+ 2,.... G.]
Each financing option, Fi, will thus be associated with a source of funding, Si, and each Fi can be
associated with more than one Sj. Matrix 6.2 shows the financing option and source of financing which
will be associated with each project and local government.
Matrix 6.2: Financing Options (Fim) and Financing Sources (S .)
S11 S 12  etc.... Sn
Fu (H1), (VI1 ), Q11  (H 2 1), (V 2 1), Q21  ... (HI), (VIA), QI
F12  (H 2 ), (V), Q12  (H22), (V22), Q21  ... (HIA, (VIA, Q2n
etc. ..... ... .....
Fim (Him), (VIm), QIm  (H2m), 2 m), Q2m ... (Hm.), (Vm.), Qm=
Thus, each financing option will be associated with a source of financing for each project (type
and size) and for each local government. The feasibility of the financing option will depend on the
impact it has on equity, efficiency, and the possibility of obtaining the funding. The vector H contains
human impact variables, referring to expected effects on socio-economic variables such as improved
quality of life, increased equity, etc. The vector V represents economic efficiency effects, referring to
improvements in the quality, quantity and effectiveness of service delivery. The variable Q will be an
assessment of the likelihood of obtaining different types of financing from various sources given the
characteristics of the project and the local government. That is,
(4) Qii = f(Pi, Gj)
The Q variable will also take into account debt service and the ability of the LG to meet debt
obligations. The V vector will contain a variable capturing the ability of LGs to meet O&M costs and to
meet all current expenditures through cost-recovery mechanisms, such as user fees. Although for non-
revenue generating infrastructure services, such as roads and storm drainage, the ability to meet current
expenditures out of local taxes can be considered.
Matrix 6.2 is the key matrix which will provide the policy maker a set of financing vectors,
which are in essence the policy alternatives to be selected by the decision maker. The framework will
guide the policy maker in answering the following questions: (1) what financing options are available to
LGs when trying to financing various infrastructure projects? and (2) what are the sources of funding for
each financing option? The crucial step is therefore to identify financing options and sources for each
project and local government.
Matrix 6.3 shows the two main types of financing, namely grants and loans, and sources that
may be available to local governments for financing infrastructure projects. The cells of the matrix will
of course contain values and indexes associated with the variables in the cells of Matrix 6.2. For
simplicity, only two rows are shown and one column for each project type, whereas the rows could be
expanded to show different sizes of grants and loans, and the columns to show various sizes of the same
project, or different levels of service for the same type of infrastructure service.
Matrix 6.3: Local Government Financing Options
Source Central Provincial Development Commercial
Type Government Government Bank Bank
Grants Definite Possible Might be possible Unlikely
Loans Might be possible Possible Definite Definite
Each project and local government will be associated with a set of financing options which will
be used to generate financing impact vectors, F(I), such that, conceptually at least:
(5) F(I) = [E(im) NMB;, (APi), (AG), (Fi), (Si), (Hij), (V;), Qi ]
where F(I) is the vector of changes resulting from adopting financing strategy a; (irm) NMBi is the
aggregate net monetary benefit summed across all issues i for which such a calculation is plausible and
reliable, that is the set M; AP is the set of changes in project i, and AG is the set of changes in local
government values for each issuej; Fi and Si are financing options and corresponding sources
respectively; H is the expected impact on socio-economic variables such as equity; V is efficiency
effects; and Q is the likelihood of obtaining financing options from various sources.
Strategies will have to be adopted in order to ensure an equitable distribution of benefits while at
the same time encouraging efficiency by minimizing costs. Each F(Ia) should also be chosen to be
consistent with broader socio-economic objectives, such as reducing inequality and generating
efficiency. Conventional analysis would collapse all vectors into a single monetary scalar, yielding:
(6) F(I") = NMB,
The vector financing method provides a vector description of financing impacts, allowing the
decision maker to observe the numbers, and its impacts on various goals. The assumption is that
decision makers are capable of expressing preferences over the vector combinations of financing choices
and policy goals. Just as consumers are capable of generating marginal preference tradeoffs across
vector dimensions of commodities, so too can decision makers express preference tradeoffs across
vectors of policy choices. To do this, decision makers must "have a sense of the relative importance of
different issues to those groups they represent (and thus to the relative importance of small
improvements in each of the issues)." (Rothenberg 1996: p. 12).
The overall goal of the vector financing method is to increase information available to decision
makers, and to provide a matrix from which they can select a set of financing options to be used to
finance infrastructure projects in a more transparent way. The next chapter takes this framework one
step further by providing an example of how a grant-loan linkage system may work.
Chapter VII. Implementing a Grant-Loan Linkage Strategy: The
Example of Water Services
This chapter will illustrate a largely hypothetical application of the VFM, particularly the linking
of grants and loans, based on limited data analysis, in order to show the potential strengths of the
approach. With more comprehensive data and project appraisals prepared by LGs for either loans or
capital grants, the analysis will be much richer and more data intensive. The major decision variables
used here are primarily aggregate income, service coverage and the cost of infrastructure provision
(capital and current). While the data presented here is for the water sector, it should be borne in mind
that any decision on level of service (LOS) for water will depend on the levels accepted for other basic
services, such as roads, sanitation, etc. In reality, the decision-making process will be an integrated one
where the costs and benefits of different levels of service among the five infrastructure types are made
simultaneously.
A. Project Selection and Finance
Parameters calculated will be used in deciding how much of any infrastructure project can and
should be financed via private loans, and how much should be financed via grant transfers from either
the central or provincial government. Determining this split between grants and loans is crucial to how a
grant-loan linkage system will work. A useful point of departure is that suggested by Smoke (1996)
where all projects are treated at the outset as if they are to be purely loan financed. Then, based on
various social and economic characteristics of the LG or community in question, adjustments can be
made for grant finance. As mentioned earlier, grants should be once-off for the capital expenditures of a
specific project, and LGs should ideally be able to cover O&M costs out of their current revenues (user
fees or taxes).
Another useful approach may be to assess the net present value (NPV) of a project for a given
LOS. Calculating NPVs could show whether or not a project is financially feasible. One way to select
projects is by ranking them by NPV, or by the ratio of NPV to capital cost as does Ichsan (1995), and
then allocating grants in a manner which maximizes the NPV (or NPV to capital cost) over a range of
projects. Conventional financial feasibility calculations only measure actual monetary costs and
benefits, whereas an economic analysis would also take into account market distortions, such as taxes
and externalities (Jenkins and Harberger 1989). An economic analysis may also show that a project is
justified even though it is not fully self-financing under reasonable tariff structures (Smoke 1996). Even
if a project is not economically feasible, equity concerns, which result from a local government (or local
authority) having many poor households, may justify implementing it. Grant allocations would thus be
needed in order to ensure that the project becomes financially feasible for the LA or LG. An economic
analysis potentially introduces greater uncertainty into the analysis as the calculations are more sensitive
to the assumptions which go into calculating the costs and benefits. While project feasibility studies are
important, and the MIIF proposes that all LGs prepare them, the analysis below will not explicitly focus
on cost-benefit analysis, but rather on how to design a grant-loan linkage mechanism.
The issue of project feasibility and implementation are discussed in the various government
documents which outline the MIIF. What is missing is the details of how the flow of grants between
different tiers of government will actually occur. This is partly due to the fact that the government is
still, via the FFC, in the process of designing a local government grant formula. Provincial grant
allocation formulas have already been designed and proposed by the FFC (1995, 1996). It has to be
decided whether grant transfers from the center or province will flow directly to LGs or to their
constituent LAs. In the case of the metropolitan areas, for example, it has to be decided whether grants
will flow to TMCs or their constituent MSSs.
Legally, only LGs are allowed to borrow money, whereas LAs may have neither the legal right
nor fiscal capacity to borrow money from private sources. It therefore appears that all money should
flow to the LGs as they have the capacity and right to borrow, and the LGs in turn should allocate funds
to LAs for specific projects. LAs could be required to submit proposals and needs assessments for
specific projects to LGs, who in turn will make an assessment of the relative need of their constituent
LAs, and rank projects according to investment priority. LGs are expected by the MIIF to submit project
proposals to the various line ministries and departments of higher tiers of government which are
responsible for grant disbursements (South Africa 1995b). This will allow the central government, or its
implementing line agency, to decide grant allocations, and to determine whether the LG is satisfying
national guidelines. LG project proposals will draw on the information provided to them by their LAs.
While LGs (TMCs in the case of metropolitan areas) are responsible for the provision of
municipal infrastructure services, the actual project implementation will occur at the LA or LG sub-
structure level (MSS in the metropolitan areas). The LGs will be responsible for borrowing money for
all projects and will receive grants from central government line agencies and ministries based on criteria
decided upon by the central government and its line agencies. LGs will then pass funds on to LAs in the
form of project specific allocations. Even for the basic LOS, for example, the LG will receive a
conditional block grant from the center and will then allocate this grant to its various LAs in the form of
a project specific or targeted "grant". Relying on LGs and placing fiscal responsibility with them as
described above will help overcome the fiscal and institutional disparities that exist among LAs, even
within the same LG. Besides tapping into the LG's fiscal and institutional strength, it is less likely to
overburden the LAs, especially weaker ones. As the transition progresses, the relationship between LGs
and LAs may change, but any infrastructure financing system will have to take into account the manner
in which these government bodies relate to each other, and how grant and loan policies may affect their
ability to implement projects.
B. Needs Assessment
The first value which the VFM should probably have is the proportion of people living in
deprived settlements, in order to identify where user needs may be greatest so as to target grants such
that they produce the best potential impacts on equity. A variable which runs across and influences
many socio-economic characteristics is local income. The income of the individuals which make up the
LG should be calculated as a ratio/percentage of either provincial or national income depending on which
tier of government is responsible for infrastructure grant transfers. For the Masakhane Campaign, for
example, the ratio to national income is appropriate as the national government is responsible for these
transfers, whereas for the Bulk and Connector Infrastructure Grant Program (BCIG) the ratio to
provincial government income is appropriate as this money is dispensed by the provincial government to
local governments. Tables 7.1 shows hypothetical income ratios of various LAs to LG and national
21income. It will be assumed that each LG has four distinctive LAs, in this case defined along racial
lines. Ideally this table should have income of the beneficiaries of a particular set of projects being
compared within the LG and across LAs.
Table 7.1: Income Ratios by LG and LA
(Proportion of National Income)
LG LAl LA2 LA3 LA4
(African) (Colored) (Indian) (White)
LG1 (Port Elizabeth) 0.30 0.26 0.43 n.a. 2.28
LG2 (Durban) 0.42 0.30 1.09 1.28 3.17
LG3 (Johannesburg) 1.38 0.75 1.34 2.03 3.63
LG4 (Cape Town) 1.15 0.58 0.75 2.32 3.06
National (All S.A.) 1.00 0.45 0.76 1.42 3.35
n.a. = not available
2 The data is derived from the SALDRU survey for the four provinces containing major metropolitan areas and
race groups. In order to illustrate how a grant-loan linkage would work at the level proposed here, it is assumed that
each metropolitan area is a LG and each race group a LA.
The lower the ratio to national income the weaker may be the fiscal capacity of the LG (or LA).
In the case of South Africa, as shown in Chapter III, there is a strong correlation between race, income,
and service delivery. For example, for water services (as with other services) the two lowest income
groups -- Africans and Coloreds -- also have the greatest backlog in services, with Africans being the
worst off.
The lower the income ratio the more likely it is that grant transfers will be required. The income
ratio column "LG" in Table 7.1 shows that of the four LGs, two have ratios greater than one (LG3 and
LG4) and two have ratios less than half the national average (LG1 and LG2). As for LAs, type LA1 have
income ratios below unity (one) in all cases, LA2 types are less than unity in LG4, LG1, and nationally,
whereas the LA3 and LA4 groups are above unity in all cases. LAs with the lowest income within each
LG can easily be identified from this table. In order to include this variable into the matrices of the
VFM, the income ratio can be subtracted from one, resulting in a higher value being eligible for a larger
subsidy. This allows the policy-maker to observe income discrepancies not only across LGs, but also
across LAs within LGs. An income ratio greater than unity will result in a negative coefficient
(parameter) entered into the matrix. Thus the income variable will be calculated as:
y = (1 - YL/YN)
where YL is local income, YN is national income, j is LG.
The next step is to identify the lack of access to water, by source, for LGs and LAs. Table 3.5
showed that Indians and Whites have almost 100% access to piped internal water, with Coloreds and
Africans having 78% and 17.5% access to piped internal water respectively. When piped yard water is
included, Coloreds' access to piped water is about 95%, whereas only slightly over 40% of Africans have
access to piped water. The parameter which would enter the matrix would be:
pw = (1 - APW )
where APW is access to piped (internal and yard) water for LGj. A lower proportion of people with
piped water would thus be reflected as a higher variable in the matrix implying a greater need for
subsidies based on equity considerations. While the parameter here is at the LG level, it can be
disaggregated to show access by project for each LA. For illustrative purposes Table 7.2 contains
hypothetical data for the four LGs, shown for total LG ("All LAs") and the poorest local authority
("LA,") in each LG.24 This table provides an indication of the variation in access to piped water that can
occur across LGs, and within LGs across LAs.
Table 7.2: Access to Piped Water
(Percent)
LGl LG2 LG3 LG4
All LAs LAP All LAs LAP All LAs LAP All LAs LA,
Internal 37.6 18.2 18.8 7.5 61.5 33.5 81.4 37.3
Yard Tap 8.1 10.5 12.2 12.6 33.0 56.9 11.9 31.7
Public Kiosk 16.7 22.1 20.0 23.1 5.2 9.0 6.3 29.6
Other 37.6 49.3 49.1 56.8 0.4 0.6 0.5 1.4
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Another parameter estimate for the VFM matrices, and the variable to be used to assess the
infrastructure backlog, is the level of service coverage by LG as shown in Table 7.3. This table provides
two parameters, namely population in deprived areas, and percent of people at or below a certain LOS.
The greater the proportion of the population at the minimum and basic levels of service, the more
upgrading will cost, and hence the greater should be the possibility of qualifying for grant assistance.
A danger with using LOS is that it may create an incentive for LGs to be tardy in making new
connections, thereby not covering as many people as possible in the next period, as lower levels of
coverage are weighed more heavily in grant allocations. This problem can be overcome by including in
the next period a variable or parameter which captures the extent of new connections at the levels of
These numbers are based on the SALDRU survey data for each province with a major metropolitan area, and the
poorest LA is data for the African population in each case.
service for which the investment occurred. The higher this value should signal greater efficiency in
spending, and low values should weigh less in the grant allocation decision.
Table 7.3: Access by Level Of Service for Water
(Percent)
LG1 LG2 LG3 LG4
Minimum 37.3 7.2 3.9 0.8
Basic 4.1 3.1 22.1 9.0
Intermediate 2.5 4.1 6.3 5.7
Full 27.2 61.1 42.4 21.5
Population in
Deprived Areas 71.1 75.5 74.8 37.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
The parameters for LOS will thus be calculated taking into account the proportion of people with
low LOS (minimum and basic). The parameter will be calculated as:
LOSL = LOSM + LOSB
L is low, M minimum, and B basic.
There are other factors that would enter into the project specific calculations, but data
availability and measurement problems at present prevent the calculation of these variables. One of
these variables, for example, would be debt service obligations, which cannot be calculated until the LG
has negotiated and agreed upon a loan program with a lender. Related to this would be aggregate capital
infrastructure investment costs per beneficiary, which can provide a measure of possible debt
obligations, although it would be difficult to draw exact inferences regarding debt service obligations
from capital cost figures, as debt obligations will depend on the type of loan, the terms of the loan, and
the interest rate at which the loan is made. Capital costs will also vary depending on local conditions.
The MIIF capital cost data, although limited, can be useful in showing the total capital expenditures that
are required for various services levels, and when related to per capita income can give an indication as
to the affordability of various levels of service. To see how capital costs vary across LGs bearing in
mind income differences, the following ratio can be calculated for a specific project (P) and each LGj:
IICij = TKEiJ/Yii
where IICi is per capita Infrastructure Investment Costs, TKEi is total capital expenditures per
beneficiary for a specific project, and Yi is per capita income for the beneficiaries of the project.
An important function of grant allocations is to supplement borrowing from private sources, such
as commercial banks or the DBSA. The idea is that grant transfers should allow LGs to provide a LOS
which they would not be able to provide without a grant transfer, but grants should not attenuate the
incentive to borrow, rather they should encourage it. For example, a LA may be able to afford borrowing
for the basic LOS, but with grant assistance may be able to borrow for an intermediate LOS. This would
be especially beneficial if the O&M costs of higher service levels are less than those of lower levels.
South Africa (1995a) stipulates the national government's position that all current expenditures,
basically O&M costs, should be financed out of own LG revenues. It is feasible, though, that subsidies
may be forthcoming even for O&M expenditures, especially in poorer LGs. The idea is to minimize any
long-term or continuous subsidies, by having infrastructure subsidies generally be once-off transfers.
The report suggests using O&M to total capital expenditures as a measure of whether grants should be
allocated to a LG wishing for a certain LOS. In other words, the higher this variable the less likely a
grant for that service level will be. The problem with this is that it is very difficult to estimate O&M
costs, especially for new services. It may also be that O&M costs to income is highest for poorer LAs
due to their lack of institutional capacity to minimize such costs. Local topography may dictate using a
technology with high O&M costs, implying that only technologies with high O&M costs may be feasible
given the topography of the region. Thus while lower O&M costs will mean that a project's current
expenditures should be more manageable by the LA, it should be noted that LAs may have very little
control over O&M costs, especially if they have little choice regarding use of technology.
Also, the government's own calculation of O&M costs is done by first calculating total
upgrading and capital costs, and then calculating O&M costs as a fixed percent for all levels of service.
It is assumed that O&M costs will be 3% of total upgrading costs and 6% of bulk infrastructure
expenditures (upgrading plus new developments). These assumptions may be reasonable, but it should
be expected that O&M costs will vary across LGs, and within LGs across LAs due to idiosyncratic
factors. The most important difference would be in institutional strength and capacity, which in turn
relates to the ability to implement projects in a timely and cost-effective manner. O&M costs should be
calculated for each LG and LA based on their characteristics and the projects they are proposing, which
may use different technologies.
A constraint may be placed on water service costs such that they, for example, do not exceed 5%
of household monthly (or annual) income." Annual debt repayments for the project by LGs should be
included in the current budget for any given year, implying that in terms of current expenditures the
correct parameter calculation should add O&M cost and total capital expenditures. Debt repayments per
annum for a project will be directly affected by the grant the LG receives at the start of the project, as a
larger grant implies that the LG will have to borrow less, thereby reducing their debt service. This would
yield total per capita LGj expenditures (TE) per annum for a specific project (Pi):
TEij = (O&Mij + Debt Repaymentsj)/Yij
Besides the project debt, overall debt obligations of the LG will also have to be considered.
Other parameters may also be calculated to capture other socio-economic characteristics, provided that
reliable data is available. One variable which should determine grant allocations is the source, and terms
of loans to LGs. For example, if certain LGs can only borrow from the DBSA due to their weak
financial conditions, then they should in principle qualify for more grant assistance than LGs which can
2 Smoke (1996) quotes J. Bastin and C. Shugart (1992) "Financing Municipal Water Supply in Indonesia,"
Harvard Institute for International Development, Jakarta, which provides a rule of thumb that households should
spend no more than about 5% of their monthly income on water. This is, however, an arbitrary figure, and while
some analysts would not agree with this rule, it does provide a useful benchmark for the current analysis.
issue bonds. These effects will to some extent be captured by the indicators outlined above, such as
income. What is needed is for the LG to submit in its proposal to the higher tier of government an
estimate of various loan sources and terms of these loans.
C. Linking Grants and Loans
This section will illustrate two potential schemes for linking grants and loans. An actual grant-
loan linkage system may look very different depending on what is determined to be politically and
economically feasible. The design of a grant-loan linkage system would most likely be a central
government decision and not a local one. The data presented thus far has been very aggregate, with
detailed data for only the four major metropolitan areas. Ideally, detailed disaggregations by LGs and
their constituent LAs would be preferred. As these numbers are not readily available, this section will
provide a manufactured example of how a grant-loan linkage mechanism may work. The numbers
shown here are purely hypothetical and are used for illustrative purposes only in order to demonstrate
how the grant and loan split can be determined. The lack of detailed data serves to restrict the depth of
empirical, though not conceptual, analysis that can be ventured.
Matrix 7.1 contains general information regarding four socio-economic indicators for four LGs.26
These values are calculated as described in the previous section, and a higher value should signal a
greater need for grants based primarily on equity considerations. The "Sum" column is a summation of
all the parameter estimates, in other words each parameter is given an equal weight of one. In reality, the
sum can be calculated using different weight assignments for each of the parameters, based on objective
criteria. What will ultimately determine the grant allocation is the weight calculation Wi in the last
column, which is constrained such that the weights for all LGs add to one.
26 These numbers are based on data for Africans in the four major metropolitan areas. The analysis that follows
uses data adapted from the MIIF and the SALDRU survey.
Matrix 7.1: Needs Assessment for Water Services
Pop'n Income Piped Low Sum Weight
Water LOS
LG1 0.71 0.70 0.71 0.41 2.53 0.34
LG2 0.76 0.74 0.80 0.10 2.40 0.32
LG3 0.75 0.25 0.10 0.26 1.36 0.18
LG4 0.37 0.42 0.31 0.10 1.20 0.16
Pop'n = number of people in deprived settlements
Income = one minus ratio of local to national income
Piped water = one minus number of people with piped water connections
Low LOS = number of people with minimum and basic service levels
This grant allocation is perhaps the simplest in the sense that grants are to be allocated in
proportion to the weight assigned to the LG. In this case it is assumed that the central government has
performed a national water infrastructure needs assessment and has set aside a nominal capital grant g in
its national budget for allocation to LGs for capital investment expenditure purposes for infrastructure
type k. This capital grant will be Xgk in total. The capital grant allocation would be CGij to LGj for a
specific water project Pi would be given by:
CGij= Wi*Xgk
This ensures that the total capital grant allocation is divided among LGs for the provision of
water services based on need. Any shortfall in capital expenditures will have to be met by borrowing
money in order to provide a certain level of service.
Matrix 7.2: Capital Costs by Level of Service
(Rands per beneficiary per annum)
Basic Interm. Full
CapCost 180 240 300
O&M 10 15 20
TCost 190 255 320
CapCost = Capital Costs
O&M = Operations and Maintenance
TCost = Total Cost
Matrix 7.2 shows hypothetical annual per beneficiary costs for bulk (upgrade plus new) water
infrastructure service delivery, and these costs include debt service.27 These costs are, for simplicity,
assumed to be the same across all four LGs.
Matrix 7.3 summarizes grant and loan amounts which would be required by each of the four LGs
for different water service levels assuming the above capital grant allocation scheme. It is assumed that
the government wishes to subsidize the capital cost for all LGs up to a basic level of service, as proposed
by Department of Finance (1996). Thus the annual capital cost for the basic level for water services is
R180 per beneficiary (p.b.), producing a total capital grant pool p.a. among the four LGs of R720 p.b.
Matrix 7.3: Amount of Capital Grants and Loans in Basic Scenario for Water Services
(Rands per beneficiary per annum)
Grants Loans
Basic Interim. Full
LG1 243 0 0 57
LG2 231 0 9 69
LG3 131 49 109 169
LG4 115 65 125 185
It is assumed that such capital grants will be distributed to the LGs as a conditional/targeted
block grant; i.e. a lump-sum transfer to each LG to be spent on the five infrastructure services. As such
LGs are free to spend the grant on any LOS and in any proportion among its LAs, but there should be a
constraint that they provide at least a basic level of water services. A similar analysis can be done for all five
infrastructure services discussed in the MIIF, where the LG would receive a conditional block grant and can spend
the money on any of the five services in any proportion, as long as they provide a basic level of service for each
infrastructure type. Matrix 7.3 shows the conditional block grant allocation which will be allocated to
27 All figures are shown on a per annum basis, whereas in reality loans will be taken in increments of a few years,
such as five, ten, fifteen or twenty. These loan amounts and scheduled repayments could be converted to annual
figures, as is done here, using appropriate discount rates.
water services for each LG. LGs have the choice of LOS, and the level chosen will determine the
amount of money they will have to borrow in order to meet the difference between the grant allocation
and the capital expenditures. For all four LGs the basic LOS will mean the least amount of borrowing
requirements, and the most money will have to be borrowed for the full levels of service.
Next a system will be designed where the grant-loan linkage is tied more directly to
affordability of infrastructure projects to the LG and its residents. Given that the focus is on promoting
equity, income is used as the key decision variable as it most directly influences affordability.
Matrix 7.4: Capital Grants and Loans Linked to Affordability for Water Services


























































































Affordability will be the key decision variable in determining the split between grants and loans
for water service delivery. Costs are assumed the same across all four LGs for each project type (or
LOS), whereas in reality these costs would vary by project (or LOS) for each LG.
Variables in Matrix 7.4 are defined as follows: Income is household per capita income. CapCost
is the annual capital cost of infrastructure investment for a water project of given LOS. O&M represents
operations and maintenance costs by LOS, and it is assumed that LGs will have to recover this cost from
the beneficiaries of the project. TCost is the total project cost, that is O&M plus capital costs. MaxRev is
the maximum amount of revenue which can be collected from consumers and is based on affordability,
i.e. the 5% rule for water. Loans are the amount LGs will have to borrow in order to cover capital costs,
such that per capita expenditures on water bills (O&M plus debt repayments) are equal to the desired
maximum household water expenditures (5% for water services). As O&M costs are fully recovered
from the beneficiaries, Loans will equal the difference between MaxRev and O&M costs. Debt
repayment schedules are not known, and it is assumed that the loan figures include debt repayments. The
debt capacity of the LG should, of course, equal to the maximum amount of revenue it can collect, i.e.
the amount consumers can reasonably be expected and afford to pay. Rev-Exp shows the shortfall of
revenue over expenditure; i.e. MaxRev minus TCost. To assess the capital grant the LG will need, the
revenue shortfall net of O&M costs must be calculated, and is given by the difference between Loans and
CapCost. This difference produces the same figures as those observed in the Rev-Exp column. Grants
will be the amount of intergovernmental capital grant finance needed by the LG to finance a certain LOS
once loan amounts have been determined. i.e. the difference between loans and capital costs in this case.
In reality the central government will decide capital grant allocations for each project and LG based on
what it believes the LG can reasonably be expected to borrow for a given project.
In the absence of capital grants the full capital costs will have to be borne by the LG, and for this
example it is assumed that these costs will have to be recovered directly from the beneficiaries and not
through the tax base, although this need not be the case. The maximum amount of revenue the LG can
reasonably be expected to generate should be indicative of the amount of debt which the LG can afford
to assume. Once this debt burden of the LG has been figured out, the shortfall of revenues over
expenditures can be calculated; this is shown in the Rev-Exp column. This shortfall can be calculated as
either "MaxRev minus TCost" or "Loan minus CapCost". The negative of this shortfall produces the
amount of capital grant assistance the LG will need in order to provide various levels of infrastructure
services, in this case water. In cases where there is a surplus, such as for all levels of service for LG3,
the grant transfer to that LG will be set at zero.
Matrix 7.4 shows that the maximum (annualized) capital grant transfer for water services to LGs,
assuming all four opt for the full LOS, will be R475 p.b. Should all four choose the basic LOS the
annualized grant transfer will be R145 p.b., and if they select the intermediate service level the grant
transfer will be R280 p.b. These figures are all much less than the grant transfer of R720 p.b. which
would result if the central government chooses to subsidize all LGs up to the basic LOS. In the new
grant-loan split LGs have to assume higher debt levels than they would otherwise, but such levels should
be bearable as it is assumed that debt repayments and O&M costs for water services will have to be kept
within affordable limits, i.e. 5% of annual household income in the case of water.
The preceding examples were only intended to be illustrative of the basic mechanisms of a grant-
loan linkage system. They used very aggregate data, such as average income, rather than the income of
the beneficiaries of a specific project, which might be more appropriate. Also, costs structures are
assumed the same across LGs for each project (or LOS), whereas in reality costs will vary by project for
each LG, and projects may also have different costs across LAs within the same LG. An actual grant-
loan linkage would take into account project specific costs for each LG (or LA) and the income of the
beneficiaries of that particular project.
The above analysis suggests that a policy which encourages LGs to rely more on loans will be
more cost-effective for the central government, and could thereby ease pressures on the national fiscus.
This would imply rethinking the government's current policy as outlined in the MIIF (South Africa
1995b) and DOF (1996) of providing subsidies to all LGs for the basic LOS. Certain LGs will require
fewer, and some perhaps no subsidies, and a policy which seeks to promote long run efficiency should
encourage higher income LGs to borrow even for basic levels of services. The simple experiment above
also shows that a grant loan linkage which "forces" LGs to borrow close to their maximum affordable
debt service levels has the potential of being cheaper for the central government in the sense that lower
intergovernmental transfers are required. Fewer grant transfers to LGs and higher debt levels mean that
LGs will have an incentive to make greater use of revenue local sources, such as local tax bases and
especially cost-recovery schemes through user charges. Such a policy could also force LGs to
redistribute internally among its LAs through either taxes or cross-subsidization of user fees. This would
be especially important in LGs which are fiscally strong.
The analysis above has shown the way in which the VFM can present data to the policy-maker in
order to decide how to split grants and loans among various LGs and different levels of service for the
same type of infrastructure project, namely water. It should be borne in mind that if other services are
included, the affordability calculations will be interpreted relative to total costs and service levels will be
a function of relative costs and benefits. The policy-maker will have a more complex decision problem
as there will be more dimensions of decision-making, and tradeoffs will be considered not only within an
infrastructure service, but also between services. The VFM will facilitate decision-making as it allows
the costs and benefits of policy-decisions to be presented along many dimensions. This makes it easier
for the policy-maker to identify not only areas of greatest need, but also where the returns to
infrastructure investments are likely to be relatively higher.
Chapter VIII. Concluding Remarks
This thesis developed a framework for linking intergovernmental grants and local government
borrowing from private sources, in an attempt to encourage efficiency while promoting equity in the
delivery of infrastructure services. The idea is that intergovernmental grants should be used to facilitate
equity objectives, while not attenuating the incentives of local governments to borrow to finance
investments. A system which links grants and loans can, if managed properly, increases the amounts
borrowed for investment purposes. Pressures to repay loans encourage local revenue generation through
cost-recovery, especially user fees, and greater utilization of local tax bases. The amount of grants vis-a-
vis loans that a local authority will be able to obtain will depend on various indicators, such as local
income, levels of existing service provision, the population living below the poverty level etc., and the
type, size and relative cost of the project being proposed.
Chapter II outlined the evolution of local governments from Apartheid structures of separate
local authorities for various race groups, to post-Apartheid structures where previously separate local
authorities have been amalgamated. The new structure of local government, while better equipped to
deal with the problems facing communities, is characterized by inequalities between, and within, local
governments.
The backlog in infrastructure service needs is detailed in Chapter III, using data from the
SALDRU (1994) household survey. Access to infrastructure services is along racial lines with Whites
having the highest levels of access and Africans the lowest. Drawing on the MIIF estimates, data is also
provided for the proportion of the population within the four major metropolitan areas living in deprived
low-income settlements. Access to service is given by the five basic services, namely water, sanitation,
storm drainage, roads, and electricity, and by level of service for each service.
Chapter IV analyzes cost estimates for addressing the backlog in infrastructure services. Costs
are calculated for upgrading existing infrastructure, and for providing services to new settlements, known
as greenfield development sites. The data show that it would be impossible to meet the backlog in one
year, but that the ten year program proposed by the MIIF for infrastructure investments is reasonable.
The role of local governments in infrastructure service provision is detailed in Chapter V, along
with an assessment of the share which local governments constitute of total government in terms of
revenues and expenditures. Revenue patterns show that local governments raise approximately 80% of
their income through their own sources, such as taxes and user fees, and receive only about 20% of
income in grants from higher tiers of government. Provincial governments on the other hand rely
heavily on grant transfers, over 90%, and own-revenue constitutes a small proportion of their income.
Local governments' current-capital expenditure breakdown in percentage terms is 70-30, whereas
provincial governments' is 93-7. Capital expenditure as a percent of local government expenditure has
declined over the last decade. These figures indicate local governments are reasonably well equipped to
deal with the responsibility of delivering infrastructure services to their residents. Estimates by the DOF
(South Africa 1992) show that under a fully devolved system of government, the share of local
governments in total government expenditure would rise by much more than revenue generation. This
points to a system where local governments' revenue sources are limited especially in the short run, but
where expenditure will have to increase by large amounts.
Chapter V also briefly outlines various short-run initiatives implemented by the central
government in order to "kick-start" infrastructure service delivery at the local government level. The
analysis shows a system that is poorly coordinated and where double-subsidization of end-users can
easily, and in some cases does, occur.
The analysis in Chapters II-V shows that financing the backlog in infrastructure will place major
strains on the finances and institutions of local governments. Income disparities suggest that
intergovernmental grants will have to be used to address issues of equity. The government has expressed
an opinion through the MIIF that urban local governments should, as far as possible, rely on loans to
finance the capital expenditures associated with infrastructure investments, and also be able to cover as
much of their own operating costs as possible. Loan repayment is also expected to put pressure on local
governments to raise their own revenue through user fees and greater utilization of local tax bases.
Chapter VI develops the vector financing method to identify various financing sources based on
the characteristics of the LG and the type of project being proposed. The ultimate objective is to link
grants and loans in a manner which allows the central government to meet equity objectives, while not
attenuating the incentives of local governments to borrow, thereby encouraging greater efficiency. The
system should be designed such that grants encourage local governments to borrow money to finance
higher levels of services than they would have without grants. An application of the framework is
illustrated in Chapter VII using limited data. The lack of data restricted the empirical, though not the
conceptual, application of the grant-loan linkage method. The analysis revealed that in terms of
minimizing long-run central government grant transfers, it may be more prudent to subsidize different
levels of service, depending on local fiscal conditions as opposed to subsidizing all LGs up to the basic
level as currently proposed by the central government.
The vector financing method allows the decision maker to observe the possible impacts of
various financing options on policy variables of interest. The framework is intended to help policy-
makers identify areas of greatest need, and assess what proportion of infrastructure project finance
should be in the form of grants versus loans.
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